Conspicuous Consumption on the Long Tail: How can Luxury Brands Benefit from Counterfeits? by Yildirim, Pinar et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Marketing Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2016
Conspicuous Consumption on the Long Tail: How
can Luxury Brands Benefit from Counterfeits?
Pinar Yildirim
University of Pennsylvania
Zhenqi Liu
University of Pennsylvania
Z. John Zhang
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers
Part of the Advertising and Promotion Management Commons, Business Administration,
Management, and Operations Commons, Business Analytics Commons, Fashion Business
Commons, Marketing Commons, and the Sales and Merchandising Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/390
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yildirim, P., Liu, Z., & Zhang, Z. (2016). Conspicuous Consumption on the Long Tail: How can Luxury Brands Benefit from
Counterfeits?. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2848511
Conspicuous Consumption on the Long Tail: How can Luxury Brands
Benefit from Counterfeits?
Abstract
We study how luxury brands can use product line expansion as a strategy when facing a threat from the
counterfeit market. Consumers who are status-conscious consider the benefits and costs of buying luxury
items in order to strengthen the beliefs of others about their status. Our findings suggest that product line
expansion strategy serves these high-end consumers and their motives to strengthen their status image. In a
market with counterfeiters, consumers have an incentive to buy additional products in order to reduce the
uncertainty of their status signals. Increasing consumption makes it harder for others to imitate status when
authentic brands signal quality and status with higher precision compared to counterfeits. Since each luxury
item purchased contributes to one's status in a marginally declining fashion, it is rational for a luxury brand to
expand its product line such that it maintains its core product and introduces peripheral products with lower
status signalling benefits and prices. We further show that an increasing counterfeit market share can increase
status-conscious consumers' willingness to pay for luxury goods. As a result, presence of counterfeiters can
increase the profit of a luxury brand.
Keywords
luxury brands, conspicuous consumption, status signalling, product line expansion
Disciplines
Advertising and Promotion Management | Business | Business Administration, Management, and Operations
| Business Analytics | Fashion Business | Marketing | Sales and Merchandising
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/marketing_papers/390
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848511 
Conspicuous Consumption on the Long Tail:
How can luxury brands beneﬁt from counterfeits?
Pinar Yildirim, Zhenqi Liu, Z. John Zhang∗
Abstract
We study how luxury brands can use product line expansion as a strategy when facing a
threat from the counterfeit market. Consumers who are status-conscious consider the beneﬁts
and costs of buying luxury items in order to strengthen the beliefs of others about their status.
Our ﬁndings suggest that product line expansion strategy serves these high-end consumers and
their motives to strengthen their status image. In a market with counterfeiters, consumers have
an incentive to buy additional products in order to reduce the uncertainty of their status signals.
Increasing consumption makes it harder for others to imitate status when authentic brands
signal quality and status with higher precision compared to counterfeits. Since each luxury
item purchased contributes to one's status in a marginally declining fashion, it is rational for a
luxury brand to expand its product line such that it maintains its core product and introduces
peripheral products with lower status signalling beneﬁts and prices. We further show that an
increasing counterfeit market share can increase status-conscious consumers' willingness to pay
for luxury goods. As a result, presence of counterfeiters can increase the proﬁt of a luxury
brand.
Keywords: Luxury brands, conspicuous consumption, status signalling, product line expansion
∗Yildirim is an Assistant Professor of Marketing (pyild@wharton.upenn.edu). Address: 748 Huntsman Hall, 3730
Walnut St. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA, 19104. Liu is a doctoral candidate
in Department of Economics of the University of Pennsylvania. Zhang is Murrel J. Ades Professor Professor of
Marketing at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. All correspondence can be directed to the ﬁrst
author. We thank Eric Bradlow, Kinshuk Jerath, Uppender Subramanian, and Yi Zhu for their comments on the
manuscript.
1
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848511 
1 Motivation
Despite recent economic crises, the global demand for luxury products increased over the past
decades (D'Arpizio et al., 2015). The growth of luxury brands was accompanied by an even greater
level of counterfeit activity, elevating concerns among managers and policy makers about the po-
tential harm to brands and consumers. A counterfeit is a lower quality, lower price imitation of
an authentic product, often manufactured upon infringing a copyright. Luxury brand managers
are concerned that illegal reproductions of their products cheapen the image of their brand, steal
demand from their goods, reduce proﬁts, and ultimately reduce their investment into creation of
new products. Governments and law enforcement oﬃces pursue a global ﬁght to combat counterfeit
activity based on the assumption that these listed claims hold. But do high levels of counterfeit
activity necessarily hurt luxury brands? Is it possible that these brands could beneﬁt from the
market for counterfeits?
In this paper, we study a luxury brand facing a threat from the counterfeit market. We focus on
one particular strategic choice of the brand: product line extension by adding low status, low priced
goods to the portfolio. Competing with a sophisticated counterfeiter, a luxury brand can follow
a number of strategies to maximize its proﬁts. We focus on the eﬀect of expanding the product
line, which allows consumers to increase their consumption and strengthen their status signals.
Formally, our study addresses the following questions: How does the desire of status signalling
inﬂuence the choice of goods and preference for variety in luxury consumption? Facing a threat
from counterfeits, can luxury brands use product line expansion as a strategy to extract more
rent? What is the rationale behind a luxury brand's product line expansion? Can a threat from
counterfeiters beneﬁt luxury brands?
Consumers' desire to signal status is a characteristic generally attributed to the consumption
of luxury brands. Status, one's position in a social hierarchy (Webster Jr. and Wind, 1972), is
considered to be an indication of her desirable qualities such as wealth, knowledge, and taste,
attractive to individuals in matters of social, cultural, and economic exchanges. Generally, a higher
status is believed to provide individuals with greater opportunities (Flynn, 2003; Besley and Ghatak,
2008; Sauder et al., 2012; Bhattacharya and Dugar, 2014). In instances of connecting with others
for friendship or romance, in seeking employment or admittance into college, signals of status can
improve one's outcome expectations. An extensive literature studies what contributes to one's status
perception, summarizing factors such as personality traits and physical attractiveness (Anderson
et al., 2001), culture (Torelli et al., 2014), ﬁnancial well-being (Campbell and Henretta, 1980),
and social connections (Lin, 1999). Among these, perhaps the most relevant to marketers are
individuals' revealed product and brand consumption choices. Consumers commonly signal status
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via possession of status goods such as jewelry, fashion goods, or cars (Leibenstein, 1950; Bagwell
et al., 1996). Ownership of status goods signal wealth, taste, knowledge of quality, and the ability
to access high-priced and scarce items.1 The need to attain status breeds the demand for luxury
brands. We build a model considering these unique properties of status goods. We assume that,
unlike ordinary goods, status goods emit signals about the qualities and identity of a consumer,
and each signal can be interpreted in combination with other signals to build one's overall status
or image. Consumption of each luxury item signals the status of an individual at varying degrees
of uncertainty. In this environment, we model how others' beliefs about one's status are formed.
Speciﬁcally, we model how consumers, upon observing signals from consumed items, update their
perception about the consuming person's status in a Bayesian fashion. We therefore construct the
utility of a status-conscious consumer assuming that status is a perception in the eyes of others.2
The consumers who are status-conscious consider the beneﬁts and costs of buying luxury items
in order to strengthen the beliefs of others about their status. They have private information about
the authenticity of the goods they consume. Consumers who desire to signal their status will ﬁnd
it worthwhile to buy a multitude of products or have higher willingness to pay to make their status
signals more credible by a costly commitment to diﬀerentiate themselves from others. Consistent
with these desires, it is rational for a luxury brand to make the choice of strategic product line
expansion. Anecdotal observations also support the notion that luxury brands are moving towards
expanding their product portfolios to include items which are considered less powerful signals of
status and are oﬀered at lower prices. Louis Vuitton oﬀers handbags, but also cell phone covers and
key holders. McLaren manufactures luxury cars, but also sells baseball caps. On the surface, the
movement of oﬀering lower-priced, lower status goods may give the impression that these luxury
brands are trying to reach new, lower income consumer segments. This, however, may not be the
only reason according to our analysis. Our framework suggests that product line expansion also
serves the high-end, status-conscious consumers and their motives to strengthen their status image.
As other consumers collect signals, each luxury unit one consumed only contributes marginally to
one's status update. Therefore luxury brands oﬀer goods of declining status and price. This way,
they can (1) motivate the high-end consumers to buy more, (2) protect their pricing advantage over
the counterfeiters, and (3) protect their core product (i.e., the product with the highest signalling
value) and core identity. Put diﬀerently, luxury brands ﬁnd it attractive to expand their product
portfolio around their core product to a range of peripheral products (products with decreasing
1These, in turn, can be informative about one's ranking and position with respect to others in society, such as
holding a a high-income job, an elite education, or family roots which facilitate the attainment of these.
2Put diﬀerently, however high a rank or status one holds, unless it is credibly conveyed and understood by others,
it will not give utility to a status-conscious consumer. It is therefore important that status signals and beliefs are
consistent among individuals, implying that everyone agrees on the status order of products.
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signaling values oﬀered at lower prices). We extend our model to study the characteristics of the
market - for instance, we consider what would happen if the luxury brand could not rank its products
in their signalling value and had to oﬀer multiple homogeneous products at an identical price. This
may hold when the manufacturer lacks the technology to diﬀerentiate its goods suﬃciently. We ﬁnd
that product line expansion is not a proﬁtable strategy for a brand which fails to diﬀerentiate the
status signals of its products.
We also study how the market share and the sophistication of the counterfeiter inﬂuence the
pricing and proﬁtability of the luxury producers. Our ﬁndings demonstrate that the threat from
a counterfeit market is its quality but not its size. In fact, operating in an environment of high
counterfeit activity could beneﬁt luxury brands. The intuition behind this positive eﬀect lies in the
interplay of two eﬀects. Status is assessed by others who observe the environment and one's con-
sumption. Presence of counterfeits in a market reduces consumers' prior about the average quality
of consumed goods, and increases the incentives to signal status using authentic products from the
luxury brand. This is because in a market with high counterfeit activity an authentic product stands
out more, and strengthens the signal of one's status. This in turn increases consumers' willingness
to pay for that product. Moreover, possession of multiple status goods is a stronger signal of one's
status, since the investment into each one of these products (thus, signals) is costly. Altogether,
the two eﬀects can jointly increase the proﬁts of the luxury brand. Where a brand loses, however,
is when it fails to keep a quality premium over its imitators. If the luxury brand fails to invest in
the visible quality of its goods, or if the counterfeiters have access to the same resources to close
the quality gap, this in turn reduces the earnings of a luxury manufacturer.
For marketing managers and policy makers, our ﬁndings emphasize that the presence of coun-
terfeiters may provide advantages in terms of making the consumption of authentic brands more
valuable for status-conscious consumers. This is because when a counterfeit market is present, the
prior beliefs about the average quality of products will be lower, and a consumer who cares highly
about establishing her status through conspicuous consumption has an incentive to pay higher
prices for the luxury brands. Moreover, longer product lines help consumers to make status signals
more credible by purchasing additional units from the luxury brand. This implies that the status-
conscious consumer will purchase the core product as well as the peripheral (i.e., lower priced and
lower status) products of the brand. In the absence of a counterfeit market, the same consumer
would have a lower willingness to pay for the luxury brand.
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1.1 Literature Review
Utility gained from signalling wealth and status are well established in early works dating back
to the 19th century in economics. In his well-cited work Theory of Leisure Class (Veblen, 1899;
Bagwell et al., 1996), Veblen suggests that the wealthy consume and waste goods with a desire
to signal their wealth and elite status, and their need to attain social status stems from the need
for social recognition. A signiﬁcant number of studies in economics, marketing, and psychology
focus on understanding the need for status including the use of counterfeits (Wilcox et al., 2009),
signalling via non-conformity (Bellezza et al., 2014) and brand prominence (Han et al., 2010) and
how ﬁrms can take advantage of this need (Chaudhuri and Majumdar, 2006; Ordabayeva and
Chandon, 2011; Berger et al., 2011; Ferraro et al., 2013; Wang and Griskevicius, 2014). A stream
of studies in marketing focus on status and vice goods investigating their pricing and competitive
strategy (Pesendorfer, 1995; Amaldoss and Jain, 2005a,b; Kuksov and Xie, 2012; Yoganarasimhan,
2012; Jain, 2012; Tereyagoglu and Veeraraghavan, 2012; Kuksov and Wang, 2013; Rao and Schaefer,
2013; Amaldoss and Jain, 2015) and oﬀering them as limited edition and scarce goods (Balachander
and Stock, 2009). Others consider the eﬀect of the desire to attain status as a motivator for adoption
of new products (Van den Bulte and Joshi, 2007). Consumer behavior literature also demonstrated
that consumers who feel powerless may choose to consume items of larger sizes, to overcome this
feeling and to signal status (Dubois et al., 2012).
Another rich stream in marketing focus on product line extension strategies. Joshi et al. (2016)
study product line scope and pricing decisions in a horizontally diﬀerentiated duopoly and show
that only one ﬁrm may prefer to expand scope but proﬁts may be higher for both ﬁrms, even in the
absence of market size expansion. Broader scope permits that ﬁrm to eﬀectively price discriminate
by raising prices for its core customers. Randall et al. (1998) study if the inclusion of premium
or high-quality products in a product line enhances brand equity or if the presence of low quality
products reduces it and show that indeed there is an association between a lower (higher) brand
equity and having lower (higher) quality products in the product line. Hamilton and Chernev (2010)
study a relevant question, but focusing on the price image of brands. The authors argue that upscale
extensions can decrease rather than increase price image, and vice versa for downscale extensions.
Others have investigated vertical extensions by studying its impact on proﬁt (Hardie et al., 1994;
Draganska and Jain, 2006) and brand positioning (Horsky and Nelson, 1992) and whether luxury
brand extensions may invite consumers who are diﬀerent than the core, or if their presence can
dilute the value of the brand (Bellezza and Keinan, 2014).
Qian (2008, 2014a,b) study the impact of counterfeiters in a series of studies. Counterfeiting
is the unauthorized manufacturing of goods with the intention to mimic the characteristics of an
5
authentic product. These studies oﬀer insights about the macroeconomic consequences of the entry
by counterfeiters into a country. While counterfeiting is an activity of theft of intellectual property
and must be combated, the inﬂuence of counterfeiting activity on ﬁrms' marketing strategies are less
studied. In the intellectual property of digital goods such as movies and music, whether piracy and
illegal sharing of these goods result in any economic harm was the focus of a stream of research. The
results from this stream are inconclusive (Givon et al., 1995; Bai and Waldfogel, 2012; Waldfogel,
2012).
Our paper makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, we develop a model allowing
consumers to update their beliefs about status in a Bayesian fashion. We demonstrate that unlike
goods consumed for utilitarian reasons, status goods can be consumed in multiples if consuming
them provides consumers the beneﬁt of signalling status. This construction allows us to compare
the items oﬀered by a luxury brand in status and develop optimal pricing strategy for ﬁrms based
on the status rank of these products. Second, we explicitly study the impact of counterfeits on
the product line extension and pricing strategy, which, to our knowledge, have not been studied in
the analytical modeling literature in marketing before. Although others before us studied luxury
branding and conspicuous consumption in marketing (e.g., Kuksov and Xie, 2012; Tereyagoglu and
Veeraraghavan, 2012; Rao and Schaefer, 2013), the study of product line extension and counterfeiter
impact are new.
In the rest of the paper, we ﬁrst start by developing a model in Section 2. We provide our key
insights in Section 3 and we extend our benchmark model to test for market conditions and relax
model assumptions in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude with managerial insights.
2 Model
2.1 Set up
We consider a market with two outlets S = {A,C} representing the manufacturer of authentic goods
and a counterfeiter that produces products which imitate the goods of the authentic brand. Under
the authentic manufacturer, we will speciﬁcally consider a luxury goods producer whose products
are purchased and consumed for visible consumption and status signalling. Each outlet can choose
to oﬀer a portfolio of products diﬀerentiated in their value of signaling status and price.
Consumers in the market consume goods for their consumption or status signalling value. Goods
of outlet s ∈ S have an average product quality q(s) = µs. We assume that the average quality of
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authentic brands' products is greater than that of the counterfeiter: µA > µC > 0.
3 4We assume
that the public has a common prior about the distribution of the quality (q) of products in the
market, which is normal5 with mean µ0 and variance σ
2
0:
q ∼ N(µ0, σ20).
Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) represent the market share of the luxury brand (i.e., the manufacturer of the authentic
goods). The prior mean is a weighted average of the qualities of the two outlets, where the weights
are determined by each outlet's market share:
µ0 = ρµA + (1− ρ)µC .
Without additional information, a higher market share of the counterfeiter instills the average belief
that a product is more likely to come from the counterfeiter outlet.
The luxury brand determines its retail strategy by determining the size of its portfolio and
the prices of the products. The products in the portfolio are represented by an index number:
i ∈ I = {1, ..., n}, where product 1 is deﬁned as the core product of a brand. The core product is
the staple product of the brand which provides the highest signalling value among the portfolio of
products. In line with our set up, luxury brands often consider one (or sometimes multiple) goods
as their core products (Dauriz and Tochtermann, 2013). We will consider the existence of a core
product not only for the authentic brand but also for the counterfeit.
We further assume that products of higher quality produce more credible signals of status. The
purchase and consumption of product i from outlet s enable the consumer to send an unbiased
status signal of its true quality θi|q(s) ∼ N(µs, (σi)2), where 1/σi is the precision of product i's
signal. Conditional on the product quality q, signals are independent across the product line, i.e.,
over i. The assumption on σi implies that the information carried about product quality holds
similar uncertainty for products of comparable rank although the counterfeits are on average of
lower quality6. Product i's signal precision increases with the ranking of the product 7:
3The quality of a counterfeiter's product can be higher than the quality of an authentic brand's product, in
realization.
4Since each counterfeit good is a lower quality imitation of a luxury good, consumers make a comparison between
the goods without considering horizontal match characteristics.
5Although the model can be extended to incorporate alternative prior distributions, a conjugate prior provides a
closed-form expression for the posterior and a clear intuition on how a likelihood function updates a prior distribution.
6This assumption can easily be extended to incorporate the case where authentic products send more precise
signals than counterfeits. For instance, we can separate the signals from two outlets such that σiA > σ
i
C , without
compromising our ﬁndings. This modeling change would in fact reinforce the justiﬁcation for the luxury brand to
invest into quality.
7Throughout the paper, a higher ranked product will indicate a product with a higher status signal, or a product
closer to the core. The products closer to the core product have a lower i.
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σi < σj < 1, ∀i > j.
Counterfeits imitate the products oﬀered by the luxury brand, providing an alternative for each
product the brand oﬀers (Eisend and Schuchert-Güler, 2006). We assume that consumers' decision
to purchase an authentic good or a counterfeit imitation is a deliberate one8. Here we also make a
mild assumption with respect to the production cost, in that the marginal costs of production for
the luxury brand is weakly higher than that of the counterfeiter for each product i: ciA ≥ ciC ≥ 0.
We consider a mass 1 of consumers who are heterogeneous with respect to how much they
care about signalling status. Each consumer is allowed to buy up to one unit of each product i.
The type of each consumer is represented by the parameter α which calibrates the importance she
places on signalling status. We assume that α is distributed by a truncated log-concave distribution
F (·)|0<α<1 and a higher α implies that the consumer has a higher desire to signal status. This
would imply, equivalently, that the consumer has higher willingness to pay for a product which
emits status signals compared to another customer who cares relatively less about signalling status.
We therefore also interpret it as a price sensitivity parameter. We assume that the distribution of
α is a common knowledge, but the status sensitivity of an individual consumer (α) is her private
information unobservable by others.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are two consumer segments: those who mainly
consume goods to signal status (high-end consumption needs, status-conscious consumers) and
others who consume goods for their consumption value (low-end consumption needs, consumption
orientation). The two segments are determined based on a threshold (α∗), where the high-end
segment cares relatively more about status (α ≥ α∗) than the low-end consumer (α < α∗). Without
loss of generality, we link the market share of the luxury brand with the fraction of high-end segment:
ρ ≡ 1−F (α∗). Presence of the low-end consumers who consume imitation products inﬂuences how
clearly a high-end consumer can signal status, because their consumption inﬂuences public's prior
beliefs about the average quality of an observed product in the market.
We represent the utility from signalling status and consumption in a stylized form. The high-end
consumer segment gains utility mainly from signalling status to others. They also implicitly gain
utility when a product is of higher quality:
αE(µ1|k, s)−
k∑
i=1
pis.
8It is possible that in some markets consumers buy counterfeits because of deceptive sales practices, believing that
a product is authentic. In this study, we abstract away from consumers buying counterfeits unknowingly, and just
focus on the intentional purchase of counterfeits to yield consumption value.
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where µ1 denotes the posterior mean of quality q. In this expression, the expected quality from
observing a consumption of k items from outlet s is the term E(µ1|k, s) and it is the perceived status
of the individual by others. So in this setting, a perception of status is created as a joint function
of the characteristics of the products which is proportional to the number of the items purchased.
The consumer's emphasis on status (α) inﬂuences how much the perception of others yields them
utility. We also deﬁne the utility of not buying any products to be equal to the public's prior, i.e.,
E(µ1|0, s) = µ0, ∀s ∈ {A,C}, for all consumers.
The low-end consumer segment's utility is mainly utilitarian and relies on the characteristics of
the brand (its quality). The utility also indirectly increases when the consumer cares more about
status and consumes a close copy of a higher ranked product:
k∑
i=1
(αµC
i
− piC
)
.
The division with the status rank of the product in the denominator allows us to construct a
preference for the low-end consumers to care about status and consuming imitations of higher
ranked luxury brands. Consumers have an order of preference, even for the counterfeiter's portfolio.
Notice that in our setting both consumer segments care about the quality of the product and status.9
Moreover, we will also prove that given the utility formulation, low-end consumers will prefer to
buy from the counterfeiter over buying from the luxury brand.
Importantly, our setting allows products to be diﬀerentiated vertically. Vertical diﬀerentiation,
or an agreement among public about the quality of the observed products is important for consumers
to reliably signal their status. If consumers carried diﬀerent beliefs about which product constitutes
a higher status signal, there may be no agreement on the value of goods. In such an environ-
ment, signalling status is not meaningful because the value of each product varies from consumer
to consumer. To properly study status signalling and derive equilibrium results, it is important
that individuals have consistent beliefs about status signals. When consumers all agree on which
products are more preferred, such a set up is most suitable for a vertical diﬀerentiation model. This
construction is an important feature of our model, and we consider it to be a contribution to the
literature on signalling and luxury consumption.
Next, we will introduce the timing of the game and establish how consumers update their beliefs
about the status of others using the setup we have developed.
9We will show that we could obtain similar conclusions by endogenizing segmentation in Section 4.
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2.2 Timing of the Game
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Given their cost functions, the luxury brand chooses the length of the product line n and the
decision is publicly observed by the counterfeiter and all consumers.
2. The luxury brand (A) and the counterfeiter (C) choose an optimal pricing strategy for each
product i they oﬀer.10
3. Observing the market prices for each product, consumers choose to shop from the luxury
brand or the counterfeiter and buy k diﬀerent products11.
4. Consumers consume the products. Consumption automatically sends a sequence of signals
{θi}i≤k drawn from the product's distribution governed by the signalling technology θi|q(s) ∼
N(µs, (σ
i)2).
5. The public observes all the signals and makes a judgment using the Bayes rule about the
average product quality a consumer bought and makes an assessment about the consumer's
social status.
2.3 Signalling Status
We assume that consumers have a common prior about the distribution of the quality of products,
µ0 ∼ N(µ0, σ20), consistent with the market primitives. This prior will help them to construct
beliefs about the status of others.12 13 By Bayes' rule (DeGroot 1970), after observing k signals,
the posterior mean µ1 is a weighted average of the prior mean µ0 and the observed signals θ from
one's consumption:
µ1|θ(k) =
∑k
i=1[
θi
(σi)2
] + µ0
σ20∑k
i=1
1
(σi)2
+ 1
σ20
, θ(k) = {θi}i≤k
In line with Bayesian updating, the less accurate a signal is, the more weight is assigned to the prior
quality. More accurate signals from one's conspicuous consumption, on the other hand, allows the
beliefs to be more highly inﬂuenced by the consumption itself.
10We assume that outlets can only charge one price for each product i regardless of their realized quality.
11It is reasonable to assume that consumers buy only one of each product since buying a duplicate will not provide
a value justifying its price.
12Notice that signalling status is about the perceptions of others rather than what one believes of his own status
to be. For signalling to work, it is important to have consumer beliefs that are consistent about what constitutes
high quality. If consumers have diﬀerent beliefs about which items signal status, then brands cannot establish status
signals credibly.
13Consumers may be interested in observing status signals of others for a range of reasons speciﬁcs of which are
not modeled in our framework, including giving a job oﬀer, ﬁnding a romantic match, or making friends.
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Since the high-end consumer segment cares about signalling status, they also care about mak-
ing their status image as credible as possible. To increase the credibility, they can increase their
consumption by purchasing additional goods from the luxury brand's portfolio. This way, ﬁrst,
they increase the cost on others to match one's status, and second, they make their own status less
noisy. The more authentic (counterfeit) products of the same brand a consumer buys, the more
(less) credible his/her signals are, because (1) the weight given to the prior decreases in the number
of goods purchased (k), and (2) signals are informative about the true quality of the brand. To
see this more clearly, we represent the uncertainty in quality when consumption of k products is
observed as:
σ21(k) ≡
[
k∑
i=1
1
(σi)2
+
1
σ20
]−1
(1)
which is decreasing in k. And the posterior mean conditional on observing (k + 1) signals of products
becomes:
µ1|θ(k), θk+1 =
µ1|θ(k)
σ21
+ θ
k+1
(σk+1)2
1
σ21
+ 1
(σk+1)2
.
If the signal from the consumption of the (k + 1)th good exceeds the expected status perception
from the ﬁrst k goods, then the consumer will give a more credible signal overall with k + 1 goods.
Notice that µ1|θ(k), θ
k+1 ≥ µ1|θ(k) if θk+1 ≥ µ1|θ(k)
µ1|θ(k), θk+1 < µ1|θ(k) if θk+1 < µ1|θ(k)
The number of products a consumer buys is determined together with how much she cares about
her status and the cost of buying an additional product. We will use this relationship to establish
the marginal returns from consuming additional products.
Lemma 1. The marginal increment in the expected status from consuming an additional good from
the same outlet decreases in the size of the purchased product portfolio k:
E(µ1|k + 1, s)− E(µ1|k, s) ≤ E(µ1|k, s)− E(µ1|k − 1, s), ∀k ≥ 1.
Lemma 1 suggests that there are decreasing returns to making additional purchases. Although
the overall credibility of the status signal increases, it increases at a lower rate with each additional
product purchased. The decreasing marginal utility from signalling value is important because it
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allows the authentic brand to market its core product without the threat of cannibalization from
its peripheral goods in the product line. This implies that, for instance, Hermès has an incentive
to oﬀer its handbags rather than oﬀering key chains, or Patek Phillippe would be able to protect
its watchmaker identity. Put diﬀerently, this lemma also helps to explain why we do not see luxury
brands abandoning their core products to sell entirely diﬀerent goods.
Upon observing consumption, consumers update their beliefs about the consuming person's
status. Since in our framework status is attained by consuming products which are believed to be of
high quality, we investigate the posterior belief about the product quality conditional on receiving
an additional signal. The updated belief can be represented as a weighted average of the previous
belief (without the new information coming from the consumption signal) and the value of the new
signal, while the relative weights depend on the precision of this signal. As noted earlier, although
consuming a set of goods from the same outlet makes the status beliefs more precise, the marginal
value of an additional signal is decreasing in the number of products consumed. While each product
from outlet s is expected to have the same average quality E(θk+1|s) = E(θk|s) = µs, the additional
weight given to the (k + 1)th signal is lower than the kth signal because the former is less precise
(σk+1 > σk). Consequently, the marginal change in the average expected belief by consuming the
(k + 1)th good becomes:
E(µ1|k + 1, s)− E(µ1|k, s) = [µs − E(µ1|k, s)]
1
(σk+1)2∑k+1
i=1
1
(σi)2
+ 1
σ20
= [µs −
µs
∑k
i=1
1
(σi)2
+ µ0
σ20∑k
i=1
1
(σi)2
+ 1
σ20
]
1
(σk+1)2∑k+1
i=1
1
(σi)2
+ 1
σ20
= (µs − µ0) · σ
2
1(k)
σ20
· σ
2
1(k)
σ21(k) + (σ
k+1)2
(2)
where σ21(k) follows the representation given in Equation 1. The marginal beneﬁts from consuming
the (k + 1)th product is higher when prior mean (µ0) is lower. Given the diﬀerence in average
quality and the prior mean in the society (µs − µ0, the ﬁrst term), the marginal value of additional
consumption is proportional to the product of the relative weight given to the prior (
σ21(k)
σ20
, second
term) and the relative weight associated with the (k + 1)th signal (
σ21(k)
σ21(k)+(σ
k+1)2
, third term), both
of which are decreasing in k. Consuming a lower ranked product provides lower marginal beneﬁts
and less precise prior beliefs about product quality reduce the beneﬁt from additional consumption
of products.
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2.4 Consumer Choice
2.4.1 High-end Segment
We start the analysis by demonstrating the choices of the high-end consumer segment. Recall
that these consumers are interested in signalling their status through consumption of high quality
products. The problem of consumer α is given by:
max
k,s
αE(µ1|k, s)−
k∑
i=1
pis,
where the consumer is simultaneously deciding on the outlet and how many products to purchase.
Conditional on the prices charged by each outlet for each product, she chooses an outlet-quantity
pair (s, k) which maximizes her utility net of prices. The condition which incentivizes her purchase
of the kth product is the added net utility upon having purchased (k − 1) products:
E(µ1|k, s)− E(µ1|k − 1, s) ≥ 1
α
pks(µ, σ
k), ∀k ≥ 1. (3)
Conditional on owning (k − 1) products, a consumer is willing to buy the kth product if and only
if the marginal status signalling beneﬁt of owning the kth product exceeds its price, multiplied by
the price sensitivity markup 1α . Put diﬀerently, a consumer is willing to buy the k
th product when
its cost is smaller than the beneﬁt she gains in improving her status perception. A low price
(
pks
)
or a high desire to display status (high α) makes it easier to satisfy the constraint (3). The role
of α here makes it easier to see why we also refer to it as the price sensitivity of a consumer: a
consumer who cares highly about signalling status will be willing to accept a higher price to buy
the additional product.
In the rest of our analysis, the expression for the marginal beneﬁt of buying the kth good will
be commonly used. We will simply call this diﬀerence the signalling value of the kth good, and
introduce a parameter to make the expressions easier to follow for the reader. From Equation 2, let
βks ≡
1
E(µ1|k, s)− E(µ1|k − 1, s) =
1
(µs − µ0)σ
2
1(k−1)
σ20
· σ21(k−1)
σ21(k−1)+σ2k
for all k ≤ n (4)
denote the inverse of marginal signalling value after buying the kth product from outlet s. A high βks
implies that the purchase of the kth product yields little signalling beneﬁt to a consumer. Therefore
consumers would prefer to buy products which have a lower βks .
Lemma 2. (Product Price- Status Signalling Order) The marginal consumer in the high-end
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segment buys multiple products from the same outlet if and only if the prices of the products are
decreasing in their signalling rank.
Recall that the signalling value of consuming an additional good is decreasing monotonically.
This suggests that unless the prices follow the same trend (decrease monotonically), there are no
incentives for the marginal consumer to buy additional products. A deviation from this order would
imply that portfolio expansion by the brands is wasteful due to potential drop in the sales of existing
products in the line14.
Proposition 1. (Competitive Advantage in Pricing) The diﬀerence in prices between two
sequentially ranked products can be smaller for the luxury brand compared to the diﬀerence in prices
of the two sequentially ranked products of the counterfeiter. This means that luxury brands have a
narrower spacing in pricing and require less drastic price discounting as they move from their core
product to peripheral products in their signalling order.
Proposition 1 holds because high-end consumers enjoy status (i.e., have higher α) and for any
given price of the kth product, (3) is less likely to bind for the luxury brand compared to the coun-
terfeiter. When the product line length is identical between the luxury brand and the counterfeiter,
we should observe a higher degree of price dispersion for the counterfeit products, showing a greater
price gap in oﬀerings compared to the luxury brand. For the luxury brand managers, this ﬁnding
emphasizes their pricing power over the counterfeiters: they can maintain higher prices on aver-
age for each good even if the counterfeiter were to oﬀer an imitation for each one of them. If the
consumers on average became less concerned with status, this pricing advantage would erode.
Lemma 3. (High-end Consumer Preference for Luxury) High-end consumers buy from out-
let s if and only if the posterior mean of its quality distribution is above the mean of the prior.
Consequently, they have an incentive to buy only from the luxury brand.
Equation 2 shows that the sign of the marginal value of buying the kth good from outlet s
depends on the sign of (µs−µ0). In line with the desire of the high-end consumers to signal status,
Lemma 3 suggests that any consumption by the consumers in this segment must enhance their
image compared to the status they would have without any consumption. Recall that the prior
beliefs are centered around a weighted average of the mean qualities of the luxury brand's and the
counterfeiter's goods, µ0 = ρµA+ (1−ρ)µC . Since the average quality of the luxury goods is higher
than that of the counterfeiter (µA > µC), the diﬀerence between the mean qualities of the luxury
14We will prove this implication on the single-price setting formally in the Section 4.
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good and the average good in the market (µA − µ0) is positive, while that between the counterfeiter
and the average good (µC − µ0) is negative. In order to increase their status perceptions, high-end
consumers have an incentive to buy only from the luxury brand and not from the counterfeiter. This
is because no matter how attractive the price of a counterfeit good is, ex ante, visible consumption
of it always lowers the posterior quality perception, or status. Consequently, only the low-end but
not the high-end consumers buy the counterfeit goods.
Lemma 4. (Ranking Order in Status Goods Consumption) If the diﬀerence in signalling
value is greater compared to the diﬀerence in prices across two consecutively ranked products in the
luxury brand portfolio, that is, if
βkA
βk−1A
≥ p
k−1
A
pkA
,∀1 < k ≤ n
consumers who buy the lower ranked product also buy all the products ranked above it.
Lemma 4 suggests that consumption of luxury products follows a signalling and price order.
Consumers who care about signalling status will ﬁrst buy the core product and then gradually
choose to add other peripheral products to their consumption, until the cost of purchasing a product
exceeds its marginal signalling beneﬁt. For manufacturers, it is important that there is a preference
order to consumption, otherwise product line expansion is not meaningful since some products
would not ﬁnd adequate demand.
2.4.2 Low-end Segment
For the low-end segment who cares less about signalling status, the main driver of consumption is
the quality of a product (e.g., longer product life, sturdiness, better materials, better functionality).
These consumers solve the problem of selecting k products such that their utility will be maximized
considering the quality of a product15:
max
k
k∑
i=1
(αµC
i
− piC
)
.
The expression suggests that all else being identical, a consumer would prefer a higher quality
product closer to the core, at a lower price. A consumer who cares relatively more about status,
all else being equal, enjoys the product more. Here the term in the denominator considers the
15We also discuss in Section 4.2 the case where consumers in high and low-end segments have the same form of
utility function and segmentation is endogenous.
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marginally decreasing utility attained from the lower status signalling (lower ranked items). The
division by the ranking order of the products allows us to introduce the status consideration for
the consumers, independently of the quality. According to this utility function, a low-end consumer
endowed with α is willing to buy a counterfeit product i if and only if its price is lower than a
threshold status-quality-ranking value:
piC ≤
αµC
i
.
We will use the expressions derived for the utility functions and the threshold values which motivate
consumption to derive the optimal product line policies for the brand next.
3 Product Line Strategy
We start the analysis by discussing the product line strategy for the luxury brand.16 17 The proﬁt
function of the luxury brand which oﬀers n products can be formally expressed as the product of
the proﬁt from the ith ranked product and its demand, subject to the constraint that the product
follows the signaling value and pricing order laid out in Lemma 4:
Π(A,n) =
n∑
i=1
[(piA − ciA)Di(piA)]
s.t.
βkAp
k
A ≤ βk+1A pk+1A for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n (5)
where Di(p
i
A) is the demand for product i sold at price p
i
A. In order to avoid trivial results, we focus
on the case where the most status-sensitive consumers should at least buy one authentic product.
Moreover, the production cost of the core product should not exceed the willingness-to-pay of the
most status-sensitive consumers (α = 1) by construction. Hence we make the assumption that
c1A ≤
(
β1A
)−1
throughout our analysis18. In this case, the demand for each product k (≤ n) is
16The counterfeiter mimics the products of the luxury brand, therefore will have an identical product line length.
17Notice that diﬀerentiation along quality is another possibility, but a riskier one for a luxury brand. If the quality
of the goods decreased with the size of the portfolio, the brand would open itself to the threat of diluting its quality
perception. Therefore we study a strategy where the brand diﬀerentiates along products while keeping the quality
uniform.
18Notice that for α = 1, αβ1
−1
A = β
1−1
A is the highest price a consumer would be willing to pay for the core. This
price should not be lower than the cost of production, i.e., c1A for the ﬁrm to produce the product.
16
0 0.2 α∗ 0.6 0.8 1
α
product 1
product k − 1
product k
Figure 1: Example for the Demand Structure for the Luxury Brand
described by the following expressions for the luxury brand and the counterfeiter, respectively:
Dk(p
k
A) = 1− F ( max
l=1,...,k
{plAβlA})
= 1− F (pkAβkA)
Dk(p
k
C) = F (α
∗)− F (kp
k
C
µC
),
The demand of each product is fragmented conditional on the ranking order captured by each
market. Figure 1 demonstrates an example demand structure on the unit interval. The total
demand corresponds to the mass of consumers endowed with the status consciousness of α above
the threshold value α∗. Starting with the marginal consumer who ﬁnds it worthwhile to invest only
in the core product, as the status concerns of the consumers increase, they gradually expand their
basket size. The consumer with the highest status concern (α = 1) buys k products, starting from
the core, reaching to the kth product which satisﬁes the condition given in Lemma 1. Since high-end
consumers who are willing to buy lower-ranked products must already own higher-ranked products,
the demand for lower-ranked products (equivalently, the number of products purchased, k) must
be a subset of demand of higher-ranked ones. Note that if F (·) is a Uniform distribution on [0, 1],
the demand function becomes linear in price. We will focus on this special case to derive the key
insights.
3.1 Pricing of Products
3.1.1 Authentic Brand
Let the luxury brand's optimal price vector be pA = (p
1
A, p
2
A, ..., p
n
A) for items 1 to n in the portfolio.
The prices of the n products can be obtained by solving a system of n ﬁrst order conditions (1 ≤
k ≤ n):
0 = [1− F (βkApkA)]− (pkA − ckA)βkAf(βkApkA) +
(
λk−1 · 1{k≥2} − λk · 1{k≤n−1}
) · βkA
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subject to (n− 1) signal value to price ratio constraints from Lemma 4:
0 = λk(β
k+1
A p
k+1
A − βkApkA)
0 ≤ λk
0 ≤ βk+1A pk+1A − βkApkA
∀k,1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1
where 1{·} is the indicator function that equals to 1 if the condition in the curly bracket holds and
0 otherwise. The signal values are deﬁned in line with Equation 4:
βkA =
1
(µA − µ0)σ
2
1(k−1)
σ20
· σ21(k−1)
σ21(k−1)+σ2k
for all k ≤ n.
Without loss of generality, to provide the key insights, we will assume that the distribution shap-
ing the demand function F (·) is a Uniform distribution with support on [0, 1]. Under Uniform
distribution, the system of equations reduces to
0 = 1− 2β1Ap1A + (c1A − λ1)β1A
0 = 1− 2β2Ap2A + (c2A + λ1 − λ2)β2A
...
0 = 1− 2βnApnA + (cnA + λn−1)βnA
s.t.
0 = λk(β
k+1
A p
k+1
A − βkApkA)
0 ≤ λk
0 ≤ βk+1A pk+1A − βkApkA
∀k,1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
To understand the optimal pricing and product length, we can solve this system of equations
subject to the constraint set. We provide the solution in the Appendix and summarize the two
possible pricing strategies for luxury brand portfolios, conditional on the relative signal value of
consecutive goods to their production cost. We refer to these cases as the high and low economies
of scope. According to Panzar and Willig (1981), there are economies of scope when it is less costly
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to combine two or more products in one ﬁrm than to produce them separately. Similarly, we will
compare relative cost
(
ck+1A /c
k
A
)
of expanding the product line to one more good to the relative
beneﬁt provided to consumers
(
βkA/β
k+1
A
)
which drives their willingness to pay. A ﬁrm which can
oﬀer high status beneﬁts to customers by expanding its product line relative to the cost of expansion
should establish longer product lines.
Case 1 (High Economies of Scope): The ﬁrst case we analyze is the environment where the relative
costs of producing one more product is lower than the signalling beneﬁts a consumer can obtain from
the additional product in the line, formally when
(
ck+1A
ckA
≤ βkA
βk+1A
)
holds for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1.We
prove in the Appendix that in Case 1, all the multipliers are strictly positive: λk > 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1,
which implies that all the inequality constraints in Equation (5) are binding. Let m be the eﬀective
price of a good that divides the actual price by its signalling beneﬁt m := p1Aβ
1
A = p
2
Aβ
2
A = ... =
pnAβ
n
A. Substituting into the ﬁrst n− 1 ﬁrst order conditions to solve for the Lagrange multipliers λ
yields:
λk =
k∑
i=1
[ciA +
(1− 2m)
βiA
] ∀k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
And the last ﬁrst order condition yields
λn−1 = −cnA −
1− 2m
βn
.
Combining the last two equations for λn−1, we derive m = 12 +
∑n
i=1 c
i
A
2
∑n
i=1
1
βi
A
and the optimal price of
product k expressed in terms of the signalling value of the product is given by:
pkA =

1
2βkA
+
∑n
i=1 c
i
A
2
∑n
i=1
βk
A
βi
A
if m ≥ α∗
α∗
βkA
o/w
Demand is given by
Dk(p
k
A) =

1−m = 12 −
∑n
i=1 c
i
A
2
∑n
i=1
1
βi
A
if m ≥ α∗
1− α∗ o/w
Case 2 (Low Economies of Scope): The second case we consider is when the cost of expanding
the product line is high relative to the beneﬁts delivered to consumers, where
ck+1A
ckA
>
βkA
βk+1A
holds
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for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. In this case, the cost of adding the next product to the line is greater than
its additional signalling beneﬁts. We prove in the Appendix that the solution requires all Lagrange
multipliers to be set to zero, that is, λ1 = λ2 = ... = λn−1 = 0 and the prices of products are given
by:
pkA = min
{
1
2βkA
+
ckA
2
,
α∗
βkA
}
Demand is given by:
Dk(p
k
A) =

1
2 −
ckAβ
k
A
2 if c
k
Aβ
k
A ≥ 2α∗ − 1
1− α∗ o/w
Notice that the prices of the products take a value proportional to their signalling value and
their marginal cost of production. When ckAβk ≥ 2α∗−1, an increase in either of these terms results
in an increase in the prices and a decrease in the demand. Compared to Case 1, the diﬀerence
between the pricing and the demand of the two cases is how the signals of the products in the line
inﬂuence each other's value. In Case 1, the price of each product is inﬂuenced by the signalling
values of the other purchased products. In Case 2, each product's signalling value only inﬂuences
its own price and demand. We stress this diﬀerence in the following proposition and discussion.
Proposition 2. (Optimal Pricing) A luxury brand may optimally take a portfolio approach or
not in pricing its products depending on whether the marginal cost declines faster than the marginal
signalling value moving from the core to peripheral products. When it does, it is optimal for the
luxury brand to charge prices such that the signal values of all products in a line inﬂuence each other.
When it does not, optimal pricing calls for pricing goods independently based on their individual
signalling value.
Focusing on how the signalling beneﬁt to cost ratio of two consecutively ordered products changes(
ck+1A
ckA
≤ βkA
βk+1A
)
, Cases 1 and 2 compare a luxury brand with suﬃcient economies of scope to another
without it. The proposition suggests that there are two optimal pricing regimes for luxury brands,
conditional on their costs and beneﬁts from product line extension. When the signalling beneﬁt to
cost ratio is increasing in k (Case 1), a manager has to price each product considering the relative
position of each product in the product portfolio. That is, prices are strategically set considering
the relative signalling value and costs of all the other products in the product line. If the opposite
holds (Case 2), each product is priced according to its individual signal value and cost. The prices
of the products in this case are independent. In both cases, the ﬁrst (core) product a ﬁrm sells to
each consumer is priced the highest independent of its consumption value; and the unit price falls
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for every extra product a consumer purchases.19
A luxury brand which can take advantage of economies of scope (Case 1) will oﬀer an identical
eﬀective price m (actual price over the signal value) for all its products in the line so that every
consumer who shops from the luxury brand is willing to buy all the products it oﬀers. Therefore,
the actual price falls for a product with a lower rank as its signalling value falls. Since the eﬀective
price aggregates information on the cost of all products in the line, additional cost of producing any
product in the line inﬂuences the price of another good indirectly. For another brand with lower
economies of scope, the costs of producing additional products will be relatively high and thus it
has to set a higher eﬀective price for lower ranked products as opposed to that of the core product.
This indicates that the brand has a narrower proﬁt margin for each additional product in the line.
As a result, some high-end consumers buy one product while others buy multiple products, but only
the most status-conscious consumers will buy all the products oﬀered by the luxury brand.
3.2 Impact of Counterfeit Activity on the Luxury Brand
Counterfeiting activity is considered a problem for most luxury brands, but unfortunately, little
is known or characterized about how a consumer's status signals are inﬂuenced by the increased
counterfeit activity in the market. This question of course ties directly to the performance of luxury
brands.
First, let's analyze what happens to how visibly a consumer can distinguish his status as the
market share of counterfeiter (1 − ρ) increases. As the market is crowded out by the counterfeits,
the (public's) prior on the average quality of an observed good µ0 declines. Put diﬀerently, a higher
market share of the counterfeiter instills the average belief that a product is more likely to come
from the counterfeiter outlet. In turn, any product that is of higher quality will become easier to
distinguish from others in that (µA − µ0) is larger. Formally, an increase in the counterfeit activity
implies that the marginal value of signalling (βiA)
−1 of each authentic product i will be increased
by the same factor: consumption of an authentic good is more valuable in terms of signalling status
in a market with higher consumption of counterfeits.
Second, let's focus on what happens to the proﬁts of a luxury brand as consumers can establish
a clear image of status by consuming it. The counterfeiter activity leads to higher proﬁts earned by
the authentic brand because a strong status signal attached to a product increases the willingness
to pay of the consumer.
19Note that if the production cost of all the products are identical, then
ck+1
A
ck
A
= 1, which is a special case under
Case 2.
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To see the impact of market characteristics on price, sales, and proﬁt of the authentic brands
clearly, let's rewrite the marginal value from signalling of the kth product as a function of the market
share of counterfeits (1− ρ), and the diﬀerence in average quality of the luxury and the counterfeit
goods (∆µ := µA − µC) :
(βkA)
−1 = (1− ρ)∆µσ
2(k − 1)
σ20
· σ
2(k − 1)
σ2(k − 1) + (σk)2
The expression delivers the insight that the marginal signalling value is higher when the market
share of the counterfeits is higher. This is because a consumer will stand out more with her visible
consumption when everyone else is consuming the lower quality counterfeit goods. In Figure 2, we
present results from a numerical simulation20 which demonstrates how a change in the market share
of the counterfeits (1− ρ) inﬂuences the optimal length of the portfolio and the price of the core
product.
The simulation points to two clear patterns: an increasing share of the counterfeiter pushes
brands to extend their product line and the core product has more signalling value and thus higher
price.21 It also implies that the optimal product line should remain the same if the market share of
the counterfeits is within a certain range. As the prices of the goods in the portfolio increase, this
pushes the demand downward, resulting in the inverse U-shaped relationship for the total revenue
of the brand. Therefore an increasing proportion of counterfeit activity, until a threshold, can make
consumption of the authentic goods more valuable from the perspective of signalling status and
drive prices and revenue higher. In a market congested with counterfeit activity, however, the prices
are so high that only a very small segment of consumers can aﬀord them, and revenues are declining
again.
Proposition 3. (Counterfeiter Impact on Brand Proﬁt) Under the optimal product line
decision, when the size of the low-end consumer segment is moderate, the luxury brand's proﬁt
increases in the market share of the counterfeiter. In other words, luxury brands can beneﬁt from
an increase in the counterfeit activity.
Proposition 3 speciﬁcally focuses on the proﬁt as an outcome and demonstrates a key takeaway
from our study: luxury brands can beneﬁt from an increased counterfeit activity. As the market
share of the counterfeits increases, the signalling value of the luxury products increases, which
in turn can increase the proﬁtability of the luxury brands. Notice, however, that the positive
20In this exercise, we set ∆µ = 30, σ1/σ0 = 1 and c
k
A = 1, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ n.
21Since the change in ρ is continuous whereas the change in product line length is discrete (it can only take integer
numbers), the relationship in the top graph exhibits a saw-tooth shape.
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Figure 2: Luxury Brand Product Line and Total Revenue vs. Market Share of the Counterfeit
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impact on proﬁts is conditional on the size of the low-end segment, and the increase only holds
when the segment is not too large. For Proposition 3 to hold, there must exist a market for the
counterfeiter.22 The magnitude of the increase in proﬁt depends on how fast the market for high-
end consumers (1− α∗) shrinks vs. how fast the prior µ0 decreases as α∗ is larger. Moreover, the
greater the diﬀerence in quality (∆µ) between the luxury brand and the counterfeiter is, the faster
the signalling value of the authentic product increases when the counterfeit market expands, feeding
into a greater increase in the proﬁt of luxury brand.
Proposition 4. (Counterfeiter Impact on Brand Revenue & Pricing) As the market share
of the counterfeiter increases, for the luxury brand
(i) total revenue exhibits an inverse U-shape (increases and then decreases),
(ii) keeping the product line ﬁxed, the optimal price of each product is monotonically increasing, and
(iii) the diﬀerence between the optimal prices of the core and the lowest ranked product widens.
We ﬁnd in Proposition 4 parts (i) and (ii) that total revenue exhibits an inverse U-curve while
the price of the core product always beneﬁts from the presence of a higher counterfeit activity. There
is a pricing advantage in a market with higher counterfeiting activity because the consumption of
each authentic product emits a more credible signal. Figure 3 demonstrates how the proﬁt of the
22We show in the Appendix that a suﬃcient condition for the proposition to hold is α∗ ≤ 2
3
. Within this range,
high-end consumers do not crowd out the market.
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Figure 3: Total Proﬁt and Prices of the Luxury Brand vs. Counterfeit Market Share
luxury brand moves as the market share of the counterfeiter moves and how quality premium (∆µ)
aﬀects the scale of this trend.
Proposition 4 also points to a counter-intuitive ﬁnding related to the sales and price management
of a luxury brand. Generally, higher sales leads to higher prices. That is, it is easy for a luxury brand
manager to increase the prices of her products if the sales numbers are improving. According to the
proposition, keeping the product line length ﬁxed23, it is optimal for the luxury brand to increase
the prices of its old products while extending its product line even if the sales are in decline. This is
because when the counterfeiter captures a larger fraction of the market, by diﬀerentiating its loyal
customers from the rest of the population, the luxury brand charges a higher price and extracts
more surplus. Moreover, since the marginal signalling value and its marginal increment across
products are proportional to the market share of the counterfeiter, the luxury brand can stretch the
diﬀerences between two consecutively ranked products across the products in a portfolio.
The strategy of oﬀering a range of luxury products can bring to mind the recent trend of
aﬀordable luxury - brands oﬀering luxury products at lower prices compared to their core product.
We consider the ﬁndings here related to this trend as well. Proposition 4 part (iii) suggests that in
a market where counterfeiting activity is higher, luxury brands are more likely to be involved in an
aﬀordable luxury strategy. This trend reveals a combined eﬀort in product line extension: the luxury
23When the product line length is not ﬁxed and expanding, the new products added to the line may have lower
prices than the lowest priced product before the expansion.
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brand charges a higher price of its core product to extract more surplus while oﬀering new products
at a lower price that appeals to its most status-conscious consumers. The key logic for the aﬀordable
luxury movement according to our framework, however, is not to expand the market to include new,
low-income or price sensitive consumers by oﬀering products at a lower price. The movement can
have signiﬁcant beneﬁts for increasing the consumption of the status-conscious consumers. Luxury
brands in fact oﬀer a range of goods which are ranked in status signals and prices so that consumers
who want to signal status can buy multiple items. Put diﬀerently, goods are priced to match their
marginally declining status signals.
Proposition 5. (Optimality of Product Line Expansion) For a luxury brand, it is not always
optimal to expand the product line. In particular, if the size of the low-end segment is small (α∗ ∈[
0,mini≤n
{
1
2
(
ciAβ
i
A + 1
)}]
), it is optimal to oﬀer multiple products, but the optimal length of the
product line is independent of the change in α∗. If the high-end segment is compressed due to the
expansion of the counterfeiter (α∗ ∈ [maxi≤n {12 (ciAβiA + 1)} , 1]), the luxury brand should extend
its product line in response to the increasing share of counterfeiter.
Proposition 5 shows that it is not always optimal to expand the product line for a luxury brand
in response to the counterfeit activity. In particular, when the share of the counterfeiter market in-
creases but is not large enough to tamper with the sales of the luxury brand, it does not aﬀect the op-
timal product line decision. However, when α∗ exceeds a threshold value
(
maxi≤n
{
1
2
(
ciAβ
i
A + 1
)})
,
it is still optimal for the luxury brand to oﬀer a portfolio of products but such that it appeals only
to a narrower portion of the high-end consumer segment. In this environment, the best response
for the luxury brand is to extend its product line by taking advantage of the increasing willingness
to pay of their most loyal customers.
Proposition 6. (Luxury Brand Quality Premium) Ceteris paribus, if the quality premium
shrinks,
(i) the demand, revenue, proﬁt, and prices of the luxury brand decline, and
(ii) the optimal product line length decreases.
The proposition explains the role of keeping a quality premium for the luxury brand. In order
to maintain a pricing and revenue advantage, luxury brands must ensure that they invest into the
quality of their brand. Put diﬀerently, in a market with highly sophisticated counterfeiters, the
luxury brand's advantage is eroding. In sum, what a luxury brand needs to do to compete with
counterfeits is to worry less about their market share. A moderately large market share of the
counterfeiter may empower status goods by increasing their signal value. But if the gap between
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the quality produced by the luxury brand and the counterfeiter closes, this will harm the luxury
brand. The recommendation for luxury brands is to ensure counterfeiters do not access the same
quality of production resources as they do, and to open the gap in quality whenever possible.
4 Extensions
In this section, we extend the discussion in the main part of the paper to consider changes in the
market conditions which may inﬂuence the strategy of the luxury brand.
4.1 Luxury Brands with Multiple Core Products (Homogeneous Status Signals)
Our ﬁrst extension focuses on the manufacturing ability of a brand. In particular, the portfolio
of products oﬀered by the luxury brand may not vary signiﬁcantly in their signalling value due to
exogenous reasons such as limited recognition of the brand, the inability to establish a core product,
or the lack of technology to suﬃciently diﬀerentiate products in their signalling value. For instance,
if a brand oﬀers only luxury handbags, the products may show suﬃcient similarity and may look
identical in their signals. Notice that when products in the line have similar signalling values, a
brand has multiple core products, but lacks a true core.
Moving away from our benchmark construction, we now consider a brand which oﬀers products
that are identical in the precision of their status signals, σi ≡ σ ∀i = 1, ..., k. Put diﬀerently, we
are considering a brand which operates without a true core. The products are not ranked along
the product line. If the consumption of these products yields a similar signal, then for a consumer
there are no incentives to pay more for any one of them. If the portfolio of products are oﬀered at
an identical price, denoted as pA, the demand for the k
th product becomes
D(pA, k) = 1−max{α∗, F (βkApA)}
And the proﬁt function for outlet s oﬀering n products can be simply represented with the marginal
proﬁt multiplied by the total demand for the line:
Π(A,n) = (pA − cA)
n∑
k=1
(
1−max{α∗, F (βkApA)}
)
.
When the low-end segment size α∗ is small enough to satisfy β
1
A
2
(
n∑n
k=1 β
k
A
+ cA
)
≥ α∗ ⇐⇒ pAβ1A ≥
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α∗, there exists a unique interior solution. The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to price are
n∑
k=1
(1− F (βkApA))− (pA − cA)
n∑
k=1
βkAf(β
k
ApA) = 0.
When α is uniformly distributed (f(·) = 1), we prove in the Appendix that the price function is
given by
p∗A =

1
2
(
n∑n
k=1 β
k
A
+ cA
)
α∗ ∈ (0, α¯0]
α∗
βmA
α∗ ∈ (α¯m−1, α¯m]
α∗
βnA
α∗ ∈ (α¯n−1, 1]
where α¯m ≡
n∑n
k=m+1
βk
A
+cA
m∑n
k=m+1
βk
A
+ 2
βm
A
, ∀0 ≤ m ≤ n− 1.
Notice that with homogeneous signals and prices, compared to the benchmark analysis, the
length of the product line (directly) inﬂuences the prices of the products, aside from their marginal
signal value and costs. The key diﬀerence is in how the prices change as the brand extends its product
line. In the benchmark model, we found that as long as a luxury brand can extend its product line
by credibly diﬀerentiating the signals of its products, extending the product line will result in
also higher prices. In contrast, a luxury brand which fails to diﬀerentiate products suﬃciently in
signalling status loses its competitive advantage in pricing. In this case, extending the product line
results in the loss of ability to charge higher prices. As the product line increases, the price of
goods decreases. Because these goods are similar to each other in their desirability, adding more of
them to a product line does not yield additional demand unless they are oﬀered at a lower price.
As a result, the optimal portfolio size of luxury brands will be much smaller for those who fail to
diﬀerentiate products in their signalling value than in our benchmark case.
To see this result, recall from Lemma 1 that the signal values of products
(
βkA
)−1
are decreasing
in their ranking order k (or, equivalently, βkA increasing in k), therefore the average value of an
increasing sequence of n elements (
∑n
k=1 β
k
A
n ) should also increase with respect to n. On the other
hand, as n increases each interval (α¯m−1, α¯m] has to be shorter and thus α¯m decreases in n. It
implies that ﬁxing α∗, the prices will drop as the luxury brand extends its product line. Formally,
the proﬁt function with n products under optimal pricing is given by
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Π(p∗A, n) =

1∑n
k=1 β
k
A
(
n
2 −
cA
∑n
k=1 β
k
A
2
)2
α∗ ∈ (0, α¯0](
α∗
βmA
− cA
) [
n− α∗
(
m+
∑n
k=m+1
βkA
βmA
)]
α∗ ∈ (α¯m−1, α¯m],∀1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1(
α∗
βnA
− cA
)
n [1− α∗] α∗ ∈ (α¯n−1, 1]
How does counterfeiting activity inﬂuence brands which fail to diﬀerentiate its product oﬀerings
in their status signals? We present in Figure 4 how the inﬂuence of counterfeits now changes
the strategy of a brand24. We highlight one diﬀerence pertaining to the product line decision.
Increasing activity of the counterfeits should not change the optimal product line length because
although higher counterfeit activity increases the signal value of each product, since all products
carry identical signals, they are competing with each other and a longer product line is oﬀered
at a lower price. Subsequently, there is only one product line length which maximizes the proﬁt.
Comparing Figures 2 and 4 which are obtained under the same parameter values, we note that a
brand without a true core (i.e., with multiple cores) chooses to go for a signiﬁcantly shorter product
line and still obtains lower total sales and proﬁt.
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Figure 4: Luxury Brand Strategy and Performance vs. Market Share of Counterfeiter (Homogeneous
product line)
24The parameter values remain the same as in our benchmark: ∆µ = 30, σ1/σ0 = 1 and cA = 1.
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Proposition 7. (Importance of Diﬀerentiation in Product Line) If the luxury brand fails to
diﬀerentiate its products suﬃciently in status signals, extending the product line fails to be a proﬁt
lever when the share of counterfeiters increases.
When the luxury brand cannot diﬀerentiate its products suﬃciently in their status signals (and
therefore in pricing), extending the product line is less likely to be a proﬁtable strategy. The luxury
brand's proﬁt will fall under single pricing if the ﬁrm extends its product line, which follows from
the fact that the marginal signalling value
(
βkA
)−1
decreases as each consumer buys more of the
same products, and as a result their willingness to pay falls on average. In summary, not being able
to diﬀerentiate goods in signalling (or, failing to price goods diﬀerently even if their signals were
diﬀerent) limits the proﬁts that the luxury brand can extract from the consumers via expanding its
product line.
4.2 Endogenous Formation of Low-end and High-end Segments
In the benchmark model, we assume that there are two exogenously deﬁned consumer segments.
These consumer segments vary in their reasons for purchasing goods, one focusing on status and
the other focusing on the consumption value of goods. We now test the robustness of the results
endogenizing the distinction between the two segments, assuming that consumers' utility function
on the entire support of α ∈ [0, 1] is given by:
1{k≥1} · [αµ0 +
k∑
i=1
(α(βis)
−1 − pis)]
where (βis)
−1 ≡ E(µ1|k, s)− E(µ1|k − 1, s) for all k ≤ n.
It is easy to show that our benchmark model for the high-end consumers is a speciﬁc example
of the generalized version proposed in this section. Conditional on buying, the utility function of
the consumer remains identical to the one in the benchmark model, except that the utility of not
buying (E(µ1|0, s)) is set to zero instead of µ0 in the extended model.
Note that consumers' utility consists of two sources: (1) consumption value, which is endoge-
nously determined by market average quality (µ0) and (2) status-signalling value (
∑k
i=1(β
i
s)
−1),
which is negatively correlated with µ0. Only signalling value is accumulated on buying multiple
products, while consumption value remains unchanged once a consumer makes his/her ﬁrst pur-
chase. Recall that marginal value of signalling from buying a counterfeit is negative since
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[β2C ]
−1 = E(µ1|2, C)− E(µ1|1, C)
= (µC − µ0)σ
2(1)
σ20
· σ
2(1)
σ2(1) + (σ1)2
< 0
where σ2(1) = [ 1
σ20
+ 1
(σ1)2
]−1. So low-end consumers obtain a positive utility from purchasing a
counterfeit good, but have no incentive to buy a second counterfeit item because the marginal value
of signalling is negative. They do not gain additional consumption value from buying extra units. So
counterfeiters only produce a single product (an imitation of the authentic core). Hence consumers
with status-consciousness at the cut-oﬀ α∗ must be indiﬀerent between buying one counterfeit and
one core authentic product, α∗ should solve
α∗E(µ1|1, A)− p1A = α∗E(µ1|1, C)− pC ,
which yields
α∗ =
p1A − pC
E(µ1|1, A)− E(µ1|1, C) =
p1A − pC
µA − µC ·
σ20 + (σ
1)2
σ20
. (6)
Among low-end consumers, only those with α ≥ α will buy any products given price pC , where we
deﬁne α as the status sensitivity of the marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying the
counterfeit good and nothing. For this consumer, the following constraint holds:
α [E(µ1|1, C)− E(µ1|0, C)]− pC = 0
Recall that E(µ1|0, C) = 0. So substituting into the above expression yields the status sensitivity
of this marginal consumer:
α =
pC
E(µ1|C) =
pC
µ0
σ20
+ µC
σ21
· [ 1
σ20
+
1
σ21
]. (7)
In this scenario, a two-segment market structure ([α, α∗] ∪ [α∗, 1]) is endogenously deﬁned by and
tied to the cut-oﬀ threshold α∗ at which a consumer is indiﬀerent between buying authentic brands
and counterfeits. Recall that in the benchmark, we had exogenously set ρ = 1 − α∗, which is a
simpliﬁed version of the endogenous case we discuss in this section. Thus the segmentation provided
in the benchmark model can be justiﬁed with an endogenous segmentation model.
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5 Discussion, Conclusions and Insights
Luxury goods industry around the world is growing and is estimated to reach a total revenue size
of $280 billion by 2020 (Bain and Company, 2013). The growing demand for luxury goods also
feeds the demand for their lower priced, lower quality imitations, resulting in an increasingly more
active counterfeit industry. Brands are looking for ways to combat the competition they face from
the counterfeiting activity. In this study, we investigate how the brands seen as status symbols can
use portfolio expansion strategies to combat counterfeits and enhance the value of their brands.
Anecdotal observations support the notion that luxury brands have been adding lower priced goods
to their portfolios. Ferrari, in addition to selling cars, oﬀers t-shirts, key chains, cell phone covers.
Hermés oﬀers, in addition to clothing and handbags, stationary and fragrances. All of these goods
have diﬀerent levels of visibility and price point. Related to this, some luxury brands also have been
involved in an aﬀordable luxury movement.
At ﬁrst glance, the objective of luxury brands expanding their product lines by oﬀering lower
visibility and lower priced additions of their goods seem to be an attempt to reach the lower income
consumer groups. Increasing the overall population of consumers who are interested in buying these
goods seems like the main goal of adopting this strategy. It is possible that this is one objective,
but our paper lays out another strategic beneﬁt. We argue that many luxury brands are consumed
by status-conscious consumers who are interested in strengthening their image by increasing their
overall consumption level. Status, however, is in the eye of others. Additional consumption of
luxury items strengthen one's image, but only at a weaker, marginally declining fashion. So it
is only rational for these consumers to buy additional products of lesser status signals and pay
less for them to improve their image (rather than buying goods of similar status signals and price
levels). We posit that the expansion of luxury product portfolios serve this latter goal of providing
the high-end, status-conscious consumers with additional products to strengthen their image rather
than expanding to consumers with little or low status-consciousness. Moreover, we show that for
brands with capabilities of diﬀerentiating products and their status signals, it is in their best interest
to expand the product line.
Unlike regular goods, consuming multiple goods from a line of products can increase the credi-
bility of authenticity, when this consumption can be observed by others. We ﬁnd that the pricing
strategies of the core and the peripheral products depend on how fast the signalling value changes as
opposed to the marginal cost of production. Compared to the counterfeits, luxury brands maintain
a pricing advantage such that when they oﬀer a portfolio of products, the prices decline at a lower
rate moving from the core product to the peripheral products. We show that in this environment,
presence of counterfeiters does not create disadvantages in pricing. Similarly, when the market for
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low-end consumers is small, a larger market share of counterfeiters can increase the sales and proﬁts
of a brand.
When do counterfeiters hurt a brand? Our ﬁndings point to three cases. First, in a market where
a signiﬁcant majority of the consumers are not interested in signalling status, increasing counterfeit
shares will increase prices, but the demand will decline faster such that proﬁts will suﬀer altogether.
Second, if the counterfeiters are closing the quality gap with the authentic brand, it becomes a threat
for the luxury brand. It is the quality rather than the quantity of the counterfeiting activity, which
can hurt these brands. Finally, as we show in Section 4, if a luxury brand is unable to oﬀer goods
which are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated as status signals, these goods cannot be priced heterogeneously
and expanding product lines only aggravate their competition. In this market, again, a higher share
of counterfeits can make the products more visible and valuable for consumption, but luxury brands
cannot fully take advantage of the product line expansion and proﬁt maximization outcomes.
Insights for Luxury Brand Managers
Counterfeiting activity is concerning to many brand managers because it is believed to negatively
inﬂuence sales, proﬁts, value of a brand and the investment into development of new goods. Our
ﬁndings demonstrate that these concerns may be alleviated to some degree. We oﬀer the following
key takeaways for the luxury brand managers.
1. Status signalling properties of luxury brands and conspicuous goods lend themselves natu-
rally to product line expansion. A unique property of luxury brands is the desire of their
target consumers to convince others of the authenticity of their investment. Luxury brands,
or brands of visible consumption, unlike brands which produce ordinary goods, can beneﬁt
from expanding their product line. Existence of outside options, even the market share of
competitive counterfeiters, can increase the desire to diﬀerentiate for those who care highly
about their status. In order to make it costlier on others to imitate status, consumers will
purchase additional units.
2. To encourage consumers to strengthen status image in a market with counterfeits, luxury
brands should oﬀer peripheral products in addition to their core product. What is important
is that these products should be suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. These additional goods should
not be of the same status level as the core (or higher ranked) products, and they should be
priced at a lower level, matching their signal precision. This implies that when necessary
the brand manager should not be afraid of oﬀering a t-shirt when producing cars. In line
with the way other consumers learn about one's status, availability of peripheral, marginally
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declining (in status), lower priced goods will motivate higher end consumers to buy more
and improve their image. These goods, unlike what the intuition may suggest, appeal to the
the high-end status-conscious consumers rather than the low-end ones. Put diﬀerently, with
product line extension, luxury brands' proﬁt gains come from the intensive rather than the
extensive margin: from existing consumers increasing spending, rather than the gains from
new consumers.
3. When it comes to the competition with counterfeiters, mind quality over quantity. A higher
share of counterfeiters implies that the average good in the market is more likely to be a
counterfeit. Since a market with heavy counterfeit activity will lead to lower average beliefs
about the prior quality, the signal delivered by each good make a larger diﬀerence in consumers'
updating their beliefs about the authenticity of a product with luxury brand quality. The
goods of the luxury brand become easier to distinguish among many low quality fakes. In this
market, high-end consumers have higher incentives and more willingness to pay for a good
that can easily establish their status. Thus higher counterfeit activity implies higher prices,
and this can also positively inﬂuence the sales and proﬁts for a luxury brand. Thus, although
there can be many negatives associated with the presence of counterfeits, one advantage can be
the increased value of an authentic good consumption in status perceptions of the consumers.
4. The one case when the battle against the counterfeiters is lost is when the luxury brand
cannot maintain a quality premium over the counterfeiters. If the counterfeiters increase their
sophistication and become visibly indistinguishable in their quality, or if the luxury brands
fail to invest into quality production, it is expected that this will hurt the brands. A declining
quality premium over the counterfeiters will result in a decline in prices and proﬁts for the
luxury brands.
5. Managers of luxury brands have a pricing advantage over the managers of counterfeiters. The
target consumer segment of the authentic brand will be more likely to buy an additional
product at a price close to the price of the core product, whereas counterfeiters have to drop
prices dramatically for lower ranked products. What managers need to pay attention is, when
they expand their product line, the pricing of the products in the line should follow the value
of the products in terms of their status signalling value. Allowing products to have varying
associations with status can naturally lead to an ordering, and when it does, pricing order
should follow. Otherwise, some of the products in the product line will not ﬁnd appropriate
demand, resulting in ineﬃcient line expansion.
33
Insights for Policy Makers
Luxury brands see higher levels of threat from counterfeiters and enforcement forces operate globally
to seek for ways to combat this activity. Most of such activity is taken under a legal umbrella - police
enforcement over the counterfeiters, copyright lawsuits, etc. Unfortunately, these strategies alone
do not help luxury brands, because they are expensive and they require round-the-clock monitoring.
Our suggestion is that policy makers should reconsider their gains from the intensive and expensive
ﬁght with lower quality imitations of the luxury goods but rather focus their eﬀort on preventing
the closure of the quality gap. The key in the battle for counterfeits should not be the day to night
ﬁght with the street sellers, or enforcement on low quality imitators. The real battle is with the
sophistication of production by counterfeits. How could policy makers support luxury brands in their
ﬁght to maintain a quality premium? Enforcement should be on the high quality manufacturing
facilities which allocate production resources to counterfeiters. Policy makers and regulators should
aim for the monitoring of these facilities ﬁrst to increase enforcement eﬃciency. Other measures
of battling counterfeits include preventing or auditing deceptive advertising by counterfeits, quality
(authenticity) certiﬁcates, and production details which cannot be replicated by the counterfeiters.
From the policy maker's perspective, whether brands can take advantage of their core consumers'
visible consumption desire and the willingness to pay for it eﬀectively should be the main concerns
for protecting the value of these brands. Firms can beneﬁt from strategies that are unique to the
nature of their brands and the needs of their target consumers.
Counterfeiting is a longstanding problem for policy makers because of the concerns that it will
impact innovation activity and consumer welfare negatively and will increase the level of crime
in a society. While our study does not focus particularly on the crime or innovation outcomes, it
demonstrates that counterfeiters can motivate brands to extend product lines. Under the assumption
that products are diﬀerentiated, our ﬁndings suggest that design and creation of new products do not
necessarily decrease in the counterfeit activity. Moreover, when these products oﬀer higher status
signalling beneﬁts, they can increase consumer welfare. Product line expansion not only introduces
more options for the status-conscious consumers to stand out and enjoy a greater consumer surplus,
but it also oﬀers incentives for luxury brands to improve their brand aﬀordability.
Limitations
We argue that an increased share of counterfeiting activity may increase the proﬁts of the luxury
brand. It is important to recognize that the same results will not apply to goods which are not
consumed for status. The desire to signal status via consuming multiple goods diﬀerentiated in
signals and the aggregation of signals to update beliefs about one's status are key to our ﬁndings,
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and it is the underlying reason behind brand's expansion of lines. One could not make the same
conclusions about the competition between two ﬁrms producing goods of regular consumption with
no desire to signal status.
Moreover, it should not be concluded that the ﬁght against counterfeiters should be marginal-
ized. In many countries, it is still important that a continuous investment into the battle with
counterfeiters is made to ensure a quality premium can be maintained between the luxury brands
and counterfeiters. That being said, our study and several others before us (Qian, 2014a; Ro-
mani et al., 2012) conclude that the relationship between counterfeiters and luxury brands is not
a monotonic, one-sided relationship with only one party beneﬁting from the presence of others.
While counterfeiters beneﬁt from luxury brands, the opposite may also hold. It is necessary to test
when and under what conditions these claims may empirically hold. We leave these ideas for other
scholars to put to test.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3:
Note that if µs − µ0 ≤ 0, the ﬁrst component in Equation 2 becomes non-positive and Equation 3 is never
satisﬁed. Hence consumers never buy such products that lower the expected posterior perceived quality.
Proof of Lemma 4:
(We drop the subscript A in β for simplicity of expressions throughout the proof.)
We ﬁrst prove that the condition βkβk−1 ≥
pk−1A
pkA
,∀1 < k ≤ n is suﬃcient for consumers to follow the same
consumption order as the ranking order of products in the line. Consider the case where a consumer can
only buy up to two products. There are only three options for her: to buy only the core product, only the
second ranked product, or both of them. Let ua, ub, uc denote the net beneﬁt of options a, b and c. Clearly
ua > ub because the signalling precision σ
−1
k is decreasing in k and thus option b is strictly dominated in
this case. If a consumer buys the product that ranked 2nd, she should also have bought the core product.
Next, suppose that a consumer endowed with α can buy up to k products and have already bought the
kth product. Since she buys the kth product, the marginal beneﬁt of buying the product must exceed its
price, that is
α
βk
− pkA > 0⇐⇒ α > βkpkA
And if the condition in Lemma 4 holds, that is if βkβk−1 ≥
pk−1A
pkA
, we can also extend the marginal beneﬁt
and price comparison to the (k − 1)th product:
α > βkp
k
A ≥ βk−1pk−1A =⇒
α
βk−1
− pk−1A > 0
Therefore, she should also be willing to buy the (k − 1)th product. By induction, if the price declines less
than the drop in marginal signalling value and a consumer buys the lowest ranked product, she should also
buy all the products in the line.
Now we prove by contradiction that the suﬃcient condition βkβk−1 ≥
pk−1A
pkA
,∀1 < k ≤ n for consumers to
follow a speciﬁc consumption order is also a necessary condition for the luxury brand to achieve optimal
pricing. Assume there are n products in the line. Again, ﬁrst consider the case when n = 2. Suppose
β2
β1
<
p1A
p2A
, then for the marginal consumer with α0 who is just indiﬀerent between buying the core product
or not, i.e. α0 = β1p
1
A > β2p
2
A, she should strictly prefer to ﬁrst buy the second product in the line. But
after buying the second product, the marginal return of buying the core product decreases as opposed to the
ordered purchase. Let 1/β′1 denote marginal return of buying the second product as ﬁrst purchase. Clearly
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1/β′1(σ
2) < 1/β1(σ
1) given that σ2 > σ1. Now the marginal consumer will no longer be willing to buy the
core product (since she adopts the reverse consumption order due to the low price of the second product).
Similarly, all the consumers with α below her in the high-end segment (α∗ ≤ α < α
0
) do not buy the core
product. However, the luxury brand can be better oﬀ by increasing the price of the second product while
maintaining the price of the ﬁrst product so that β2β1 =
p1A
p2A
. In that case, not only does the demand for
the core product increases because it also becomes more valuable for consumers who buy it as their ﬁrst
purchase, and all the consumers who are more status conscious than the marginal consumer pay a higher
price for the second product.
Similarly, suppose (1) βkβk−1 ≥
pk−1A
pkA
,∀1 < k ≤ n − 1 and (2) βnβn−1 <
pn−1A
pnA
. For the marginal consumer
endowed with α = α0 (such that α0 = βn−1pn−1A ), (1) implies that she should prefer buying all the products
ranked above the (n − 1)th while being indiﬀerent about buying the (n − 1)th product. However, from (2)
we know that she should strictly prefer to buy the nth product prior to the (n− 1)th product, because
α0 = βn−1pn−1A > βnp
n
A. (8)
As opposed to {βk}k≤n where consumers follow the ranking order while making a purchase, let {β′k}k≤n
denote the set of marginal signalling values where consumers follow a consumption order in which the
last two purchases are reversed in terms of the ranking order (i.e. the nth product is consumed before the
(n−1)th). Then the marginal signalling value of the second last purchase becomes smaller: 1/β′n−1 < 1/βn−1,
while that of the last purchase becomes larger: 1/β′n > 1/βn, because the n
th product sends a less precise
thus less valuable signal than the (n− 1)th product. Moreover, we know that 1/β′n < 1/βn−1, since the
(n−1)th product becomes less valuable to consumers if they delayed their purchase. Plugging the inequality
conditions into (8) yields
α0 < β
′
np
n−1
A
which shows that this marginal consumer with α = α0 is not willing to buy the (n−1)th product after buying
the nth product. The same reasoning applies to all the consumers with α < α0. Alternatively, the luxury
brand will be better oﬀ by increasing pnA while ﬁxing p
n−1
A so that
βn
βn−1
=
pn−1A
pnA
. Then the consumers will
again follow the desired consumption order which increases their willingness to pay as well as demand for
the (n− 1)th product, in that case the luxury brand will extract more surplus from selling the nth product
to more status conscious consumers at a higher price.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(We will drop the subscript A in β for simplicity of expressions throughout the proof.) We can solve for the
optimal price vector p and Lagrangians λ recursively.
If λ1 = 0, that is, if the ﬁrst inequality constraint is not binding, then p
2
Aβ2 − p1Aβ1 > 0. From the ﬁrst
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two F.O.C.s with respect to prices, we can obtain the prices of the top two ranked products as:
p1A =
1
2β1
+
c1A
2
p2A =
1
2β2
+
c2A
2
− λ2
2
Substituting into the constraint we obtain:
p2Aβ2 − p1Aβ1 =
1
2
[(c2A − λ2)β2 − c1Aβ1] > 0
which implies
λ2 < c
2
A −
β1
β2
c1A. (9)
If λ1 > 0, that is, if the ﬁrst inequality constraint is binding, then β2p
2
A − β1p1A = 0 and substituting
into the ﬁrst two F.O.C.s yields that (c1A − λ1)β1 = (c2A + λ1 − λ2)β2. Therefore
λ2 = c
2
A −
β1
β2
c1A + (1 +
β1
β2
)λ1 (10)
Case 1:
ck+1A
ckA
≤ βkA
βk+1A
holds for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1
Since all the multipliers λ are non-negative, and λ2 ≥ 0, we know from (10) that c2A − β1β2 c1A + (1 +
β1
β2
)λ1 >
0 =⇒λ1 ≥ c
1
Aβ1−c2Aβ2
β1+β2
> 0 must hold. We can show that λ2 > 0 holds by contradiction.
Suppose that λ2 = 0. Then
p2A =
1
2β2
+
c2A + λ1
2
p3A =
1
2β3
+
c3A − λ3
2
.
Using these two expressions, we can see that the constraint p3Aβ3 − p2Aβ2 is not binding:
p3Aβ3 − p2Aβ2 =
1
2
[(c3A − λ3)β3 − (c2A + λ1)β2] > 0
Using the inequality above,
λ3 < c
3
A − (c2A + λ1)
β2
β3
< c3A − c2A
β2
β3
≤ 0
where the last inequality follows from our assumption of Case 1 (i.e., the relationship
ck+1A
ckA
≤ βkA
βk+1A
). The
derivation contradicts the fact that λ3 has to be non-negative. Therefore λ2 > 0 must hold. The same
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rationale applies to λ3 > 0, ..., λn−1 > 0, which follows from induction. Hence we show that λk > 0,
∀k = 1, 2, ..., n. Let m := p1Aβ1A = p2Aβ2A = ... = pnAβnA. Substituting into the ﬁrst (n− 1) F.O.C.s with
respect to prices to solve for multipliers λ yields
λk =
k∑
i=1
[ciA +
(1− 2m)
βiA
] ∀1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
And solving the last F.O.C. gives
λn−1 = −cnA −
1− 2m
βnA
.
When k = n−1, the former expression (∑ki=1[ciA+ (1−2m)βiA ]) must be equal to the latter (λn−1 = −cnA− 1−2mβnA ),
we can derive m:
m =
1
2
+
∑n
i=1 c
i
A
2
∑n
i=1
1
βi
Using the expression for m, we can solve for the optimal prices:
pkA = min
 12βkA +
∑n
i=1 c
i
A
2
∑n
i=1
βkA
βiA
,
α∗
βkA
 .
Moreover, demand can be written as:
Dk(p
k
A) =

1−m = 12 −
∑n
i=1 c
i
A
2
∑n
i=1
1
βi
if m ≥ α∗
1− α∗ o/w
And the total proﬁt can be written as:
Π(n,A) =
n∑
i=1
(piA − ciA)Di(p)
=
n∑
i=1
max
{ 1
βi
(
1
2
−
∑n
i=1 c
i
A
2
∑n
i=1
βkA
βiA
)2, (
α∗
βiA
− ciA)(1− α∗)
}
Case 2:
ck+1A
ckA
>
βkA
βk+1A
holds for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1
In this case, all n − 1 constraints βkApkA ≤ βk+1A pk+1A not binding, which implies that all the Lagrangian
multipliers are zero, i.e. λ1 = λ2 = ... = λn−1 = 0 and therefore prices can be solved directly:
pkA = min
{
1
2βkA
+
ckA
2
,
α∗
βkA
}
∀k = 1, 2..., n.
Since pkAβ
k
A − pk−1A βk−1A = 12 [ckAβkA − ck−1A βk−1A ] > 0, the constraint
pk−1A
pkA
<
βkA
βk−1A
holds, conﬁrming that the
constraints are not binding and the Lagrange multipliers should be equal to zero.
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In this case, the demand is given by:
Dk(p
k
A) =

1
2 − c
k
Aβ
k
A
2 if c
k
Aβ
k
A ≥ 1− α∗
1− α∗ o/w
And the total proﬁt is given by
Π(n,A) =
n∑
i=1
(piA − ciA)Di(piA)
=
n∑
i=1
max
{ 1
βi
(
1
2
− c
i
Aβ
i
A
2
)2, (
α∗
βiA
− ciA)(1− α∗)
}
.
Proof of Proposition 3:
(1) Recall that m = 12 +
∑n
i=1 c
i
A
2
∑n
i=1
1
βi
. When the size of the low-end segment is small such that α∗ ≤
1
2
(
ciAβ
i
A + 1
) ∀i = 1, ..., n =⇒ α∗ ∈ [0,m], the demand for the core product is less than the size of the
high-end segment:
D1(p
1
A) < 1− α∗,
and the expansion of market for counterfeiters does not aﬀect the target market of the luxury brand. This
is because even the core product does not capture the whole market for high-end consumers. In this case,
the proﬁt function of the luxury brand can be expressed as:
Π(n,A) =
n∑
i=1
1
βiA
(
1
2
− c
i
Aβ
i
A
2
)
2.
Diﬀerentiating the proﬁt with respect to (βkA)
−1, we can derive the impact of marginal status signalling value
on the total proﬁt of the luxury brand:
∂Π(n,A)
∂
(
1
βkA
) = (1
2
− c
k
Aβ
k
A
2
)2 +
1
βkA
(
1− ckAβkA
) ckA
2
(
βkA
)2
=
(
1
2
− c
k
Aβ
k
A
2
)(
1
2
+
ckAβ
k
A
2
)
=
1
4
[
1− (ckAβkA)2]
Notice that as long as the kth product has a positive demand, or put diﬀerently, as long as the customers
at the top of the high-end segment (α = 1) are willing to purchase the kth product, 1 − ckAβkA > 0 must
hold. The result also suggests that if the luxury brand chooses to extend the product line optimally, the
marginal impact of increasing its lowest-ranked product's signal value on the overall proﬁt should be positive.
Therefore for a constant optimal portfolio choice n∗,
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∂Π(k,A)
∂
(
1
βkA
) > 0 1 ≤ k ≤ n∗
must hold. Recall that the marginal signalling value was deﬁned in Equation 4 as
(βkA)
−1 = (1− ρ)∆µ
[
σ2(k − 1)
σ20
· σ
2(k − 1)
σ2(k − 1) + (σk)2
]
.
The sign of its derive with respect to (1− ρ) is positive for any product line length k > 1:
∂
(
1
βkA
)
∂(1− ρ) = ∆µ
[
σ2(k − 1)
σ20
· σ
2(k − 1)
σ2(k − 1) + (σk)2
]
> 0.
We can use the two expressions above to derive the comparative static which gives us the impact of market
share of the counterfeit on proﬁt:
∂Π(n∗, A)
∂(1− ρ) =
n∗∑
k=1
∂Π(k,A)
∂
(
1
βkA
) · ∂
(
1
βkA
)
∂(1− ρ)
 > 0.
Therefore when α∗ is suﬃciently small, the proﬁt of luxury brand is higher if the share of counterfeit (1− ρ)
increases. Note that the rate at which marginal signalling value is increasing as ρ decreases is proportional
to ∆µ (the quality premium between the luxury brand and the counterfeiter). The greater the diﬀerence
in the average quality of the two outlets, the faster the signalling value of the authentic product is increasing
when the counterfeit market expands, leading to a greater increase in the proﬁt of the luxury brand.
(2) When α∗ > m, optimal price piA is tied to α
∗. If the high-end segment comprises a smaller share of the
overall market, that is, if
α∗ >
1
2
(
ciAβ
i
A + 1
) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
=⇒α∗ > m
then an expansion of the counterfeiter squeezes out the high-end segment. With the k constraints above, the
optimal pricing for the ﬁrst k products are such that they appeal to the entire high-end segment, including
the marginal customer (α = α∗). Recall from Figure 1 that the demand for the (k + 1)th product is a subset
of the demand for the kth and therefore when the low-end segment expands, the demand for higher-ranked
products are aﬀected ﬁrst. But since all the high-end segment consumers do not buy all the peripheral
products, the demand of these products may not be aﬀected by the expansion of the counterfeiter.
Second, the expansion of the counterfeiter may aﬀect the demand through an increase in the signalling
value, which beneﬁts all the products in the line. Hence we express the proﬁt function function of the luxury
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brand by separating it into two terms, pi1 and pi2 ,that captures the proﬁt from the ﬁrst k products and the
remaining (n− k) products, respectively:
Π(n,A) = pi1 + pi2
= ρ
k∑
i=1
(
1− ρ
βiA
− ciA
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi1: total proﬁt of the ﬁrst k products that all high-end consumers buy
+
n∑
i=k+1
1
βiA
(
1
2
− c
i
Aβ
i
A
2
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi2: total proﬁt of the remaining (n− k) products
The sign and the magnitude of the change in proﬁt with respect to counterfeit market share depend on how
fast the market for high-end consumers ρ shrinks (which aﬀects pi1) vs. how fast the prior µ0 decreases as
ρ declines (which aﬀects both pi1 and pi2 through the increase in signalling value
(
βiA
)
). The derivative of
Π(n,A) with respect to (1− ρ) can be expressed as:
∂Π(n,A)
∂(1− ρ) =
∂pi1
∂(1− ρ) +
∂pi2
∂(1− ρ) ,
where the ﬁrst term is
∂pi1
∂(1− ρ) =
∂
[∑k
i=1
(
ρ (1− ρ)2 ∆µ
[
σ2(i−1)
σ20
· σ2(i−1)
σ2(i−1)+(σk)2
]
− ρciA
)]
∂(1− ρ)
=
k∑
i=1
[
(1− ρ) [2− 3(1− ρ)] ∆µ
[
σ2(i− 1)
σ20
· σ
2(i− 1)
σ2(i− 1) + (σi)2
]
+ ciA
]
,
and the second term is
∂pi2
∂(1− ρ) =
n∑
i=k+1
[
1
4
[
1− (ciAβiA)2] ·∆µ [σ2(i− 1)σ20 · σ
2(i− 1)
σ2(i− 1) + (σi)2
]]
.
Under the optimal product line length, it is straightforward to see that ∂pi2(n
∗)
∂(1−ρ) > 0, using the reasoning given
in Part (1). As long as the customers at the top-tier of high-end segment (α = 1) are willing to purchase the
kth product, 1− ckAβkA > 0 must hold. The sign of ∂pi1∂(1−ρ) is ambiguous, but it can take a positive value for
suﬃciently low values of 1−ρ. A suﬃcient condition for ∂pi1∂(1−ρ) > 0 to hold is 0 < (1−ρ) < 23 . Therefore the
proﬁt of the luxury brand is increasing in the share of counterfeiters: ∂Π(n,A)∂(1−ρ) > 0 given that (1− ρ) ∈ [0, 23 ].
Proof of Proposition 4:
1. Comparative Statics for Revenue: We consider the expression for total revenue, separately for each
case.
Case 1:
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Revenue =
n∑
k=1
pkADk(p
k
A)
=
n∑
k=1
max
α∗ (1− α∗)βkA , 14βkA
1− [∑nk=1 ckA∑n
k=1
1
βkA
]2
The second term in the max function is always increasing in (1 − ρ), which follows directly from the proof
of Proposition 3. Moreover, sinceα∗ = 1− ρ, the ﬁrst term in the max function can be rewritten as
α∗ (1− α∗)
βkA
= (α∗)2 (1− α∗) ∆µσ
2(k − 1)
σ20
· σ
2(k − 1)
σ2(k − 1) + (σk)2 .︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=ξ
Taking the derivative with respect to α∗ (or equivalently (1− ρ)) we get
2α∗(1− α∗)ξ − (α∗)2 ξ = α∗(2− 3α∗)ξ. (11)
Expression in Equation (11) changes sign from positive (for α∗ ∈ [0, 23 ]) to negative (for α∗ ∈ [ 23 , 1]). (And
as α∗→ 1, the max function will always return the value of the ﬁrst term for all k ≤ n. ) Hence we should
observe the derivative of the revenue with respect to the counterfeit market share to have an inverse-U shape,
to ﬁrst increase and then decrease in α∗(or, in 1− ρ).
Case 2:
Revenue =
n∑
k=1
pkADk(p
k
A)
=
n∑
k=1
max
{
α∗ (1− α∗)
βkA
,
1
4βkA
(
1− [ckAβkA]2)}
The derivation follows the same analysis as in Case 1.
2. Comparative Statics For Prices: Recall that the price function is continuous (and piecewise
diﬀerentiable) over the support of α∗.
Case 1:
pkA =

1
2βkA
+
∑n
i=1 c
i
A
2
∑n
i=1
βk
A
βi
A
α∗ ∈
[
0, 12
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 c
k
A
1
n
∑n
i=1
1
βk
+ 1
)]
α∗
βkA
α∗ ∈
[
1
2
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 c
k
A
1
n
∑n
i=1
1
βk
+ 1
)
, 1
]
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For the ﬁrst interval, since (βkA)
−1 = (1− ρ)∆µσ2(k−1)
σ20
· σ2(k−1)
σ2(k−1)+(σk)2 , the term
n∑
i=1
βkA
βiA
=
n∑
i=1
[
σ4(k − 1)
σ2(k − 1) + (σk)2 ·
σ2(i− 1) + (σi)2
σ4(i− 1)
]
is not a function of ρ and is independent of α∗. Therefore, sign( ∂p
k
A
∂(1−ρ) ) = sign
(
∂(βkA)
−1
∂(1−ρ)
)
, which is positive.
For the second interval, when all other parameters are ﬁxed, as α∗(= 1 − ρ) increases from zero to 1,
prices always increase due to the increase in the marginal signalling value of each product
∂(βkA)
−1
∂(1−ρ) > 0 as
well as the increase in α∗.
Case 2:
pkA =

1
2βkA
+
ckA
2 α
∗ ∈ [0, 12 (ciAβiA + 1)]
α∗
βkA
α∗ ∈ [ 12 (ckAβkA + 1) , 1]
Proof for Case 2 follows the proof for Case 1.
3. Diﬀerence Between the Prices of the Core and the Lowest Ranked Product: We present the
derivation of results in Case 2 since derivation for Case 1 is similar. At any given n, the price range (or the
aﬀordability of the luxury brand) is obtained as:
p1A − pnA =

1
2
[(
1
β1A
− 1βnA
)
+
(
c1A − cnA
)]
α∗ ∈ [0, 12 (ciAβiA + 1)]
α∗
(
1
β1A
− 1βnA
)
α∗ ∈ [ 12 (ciAβiA + 1) , 1]
From Equation (4), the diﬀerence between the signalling value becomes
1
β1A
− 1
βnA
= (1− ρ)∆µ
[
σ20
σ20 + (σ
1)2
− σ
2(n− 1)
σ20
· σ
2(n− 1)
σ2(n− 1) + (σn)2
]
= (1− ρ)∆µ [χ(1)− χ(n)]
where χ(k) := σ
2(k−1)
σ20
· σ2(k−1)
σ2(k−1)+(σk)2 . As proved in (2), the marginal signalling value decreases in the number
of goods purchased, thus χ(k) decreases in k. The derivative of the expression with respect to the market
share of the counterfeits is:
∂
(
1
β1A
− 1βnA
)
∂(1− ρ) = ∆µ [χ(1)− χ(n)] > 0,
and the sign of the derivative we are interested in is positive:
∂
(
p1A − pnA
)
∂(1− ρ) > 0.
This proves that there is a positive relationship between the share of counterfeit and the aﬀordability of the
luxury brand.
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Proof of Proposition 5:
Conditional on oﬀering (n− 1) products, the net marginal proﬁt of oﬀering one more product is Π(n,A)−
Π(n− 1, A). To simplify notations, let
∆Π(n) ≡ Π(n,A)−Π(n− 1, A),
and α1+ and α2+ be the thresholds for the share of low-end segments at which the expansion of counterfeits
begins to aﬀect the pricing strategy of the luxury brand, where α1+ := 12
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 c
k
A
1
n
∑n
i=1
1
βk
+ 1
)
for Case 1 and
α2+ := 12 (c
n
Aβ
n
A + 1) for Case 2.
Case 1: When cnAβ
n
A ≤ cn−1A βn−1A holds, the diﬀerence in proﬁt due to adding the nth product becomes:
Π(n,A)−Π(n− 1, A) =

1
βnA
(1− α1+)2 α∗ ∈ [0, α1+]
1−α∗
βnA
(α∗ − cnAβnA) α∗ ∈
[
α1+, 1
]
Notice that α1+ decreases in n.
∆Π(n) is continuous at α1+ and is always positive when α∗ is below this cutoﬀ: it is optimal to extend
the product line up to the aﬀordability of top-tier high-end consumers (13) as the share of the counterfeiter
α∗ = (1− ρ) increases (but is still not high enough to tamper with the sales of the luxury brand).
However, oﬀering multiple products also increases the prices of the brand, so the interval
[
0, α1+
]
will
eventually shrink as n increases. In that case, as α∗ increases, the optimal n∗ is likely to be bound by the
constraint (12) in addition to (13):
min
i≤n∗
{
α∗ − ciAβiA
} ≥ 0⇐⇒ max
i≤n∗
ciAβ
i
A ≤ α∗ (12)
For any given n, (12) is less likely to bind when α∗ increases. This suggests that even when the fraction
of high-end consumers are squeezed due to an expansion of the counterfeiter market, the luxury brand should
extend its product line in response to an increase in the willingness to pay of their loyal customers.
Case 2: When cnAβ
n
A > c
n−1
A β
n−1
A holds,
Π(n,A)−Π(n− 1, A) =

1
βnA
(
1− α2+)2 α∗ ∈ [0, α2+]
1−α∗
βnA
(α∗ − cnAβnA) α∗ ∈
[
α2+, 1
]
Again, α2+ increases in n. For demand to be nonzero, the nth product should appeal at least to the top-tier
high-end consumers with α = 1. This imposes a condition on the optimal product line length n∗:
cn∗A β
n∗
A ≤ 1 (13)
∆Π(n) is continuous at α2+ and is always positive when α∗ is below this cutoﬀ. When the counterfeiter
market is small enough (so that it does not tamper with the sales of the luxury brand), the product line
decision does not depend on the share of the counterfeiter. Due to lack of economies of scope, even the
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lowest-ranked product will be oﬀered at a price only a small portion of the high-end segment will buy.
Therefore, compared to Case 1, in Case 2, the range of market share within which the counterfeiter does not
aﬀect product line decision is wider.
If the share of counterfeiter begins to squeeze the high-end segment, then the luxury brand should extend
its product line in response to the increasing willingness to pay of their loyal customers.
Combining the two cases, the optimal product line length n∗ is a monotonically increasing step function
of α∗.
Proof of Proposition 6:
The derivative of the marginal signalling value (βkA)
−1 = (1 − ρ)∆µσ2(k−1)
σ20
· σ2(k−1)
σ2(k−1)+(σk)2 with respect to
the quality premium has a positive sign:
∂(βkA)
−1
∂∆µ
> 0 ∀k = 1, ..., n
The rest directly follows the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4.
Proof of Proposition 7:
We ﬁrst prove the expression of the price and proﬁt function. Let's ﬁx n, the length of product line.
Also assume that the price of all products weakly exceed their production cost i.e., pA ≥ cA. Since the
proﬁt function is piecewise diﬀerentiable with respect to prices, we consider a set of price intervals P =
( α
∗
βnA
, α
∗
βn−1A
] ∪ ( α∗
βn−1A
, α
∗
βn−2A
] ∪ ... ∪ ( α∗
β2A
, α
∗
β1A
] within each the proﬁt function is continuous and diﬀerentiable.
Suppose pA ∈ ( α∗βm+1A ,
α∗
βmA
] holds for any 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1. Note that when the prices are set in this range,
the entire high-end segment buys the mth product. Let's see how the proﬁt function behaves when the price
is declining.
∂Π(A,n)
∂ (−pA) = −m(1− α
∗)−
n∑
k=m+1
(
1− βkApA
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
proﬁt loss due to lower price
+ (pA − cA)
n∑
k=m+1
βkA︸ ︷︷ ︸
proﬁt gain due to higher demand for the last (n−m) products
= −n+mα∗ + (2pA − cA)
n∑
k=m+1
βkA
which is positive if and only if
pA >
1
2
[
n−mα∗∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ cA
]
.
If the derivative is negative, then 12
[
n−mα∗∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ cA
]
≥ α∗βmA ⇐⇒ α
∗ ≤
n∑n
k=m+1
βk
A
+cA
m∑n
k=m+1
βk
A
+ 2
βm
A
:= α¯m, then p∗A ≥
α∗
βmA
. If on the other hand the derivative is positive, that is, if 12
[
n−mα∗∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ cA
]
≤ α∗
βm+1A
⇐⇒ α∗ ≥
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n∑n
k=m+1
βk
A
+cA
m∑n
k=m+1
βk
A
+ 2
β
m+1
A
:= αm+1, then p∗A ≤ α
∗
βm+1A
. Finally, if α∗ ∈ (α¯m, αm+1]25, then p∗A ∈ ( α
∗
βm+1A
, α
∗
βmA
].
Next we show that the relationships demonstrated applies to all the intervals in 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1 and the
intervals are connected and are well-deﬁned, by ensuring that α¯m > α¯m−1 and αm − α¯m < 0. First,
α¯m − α¯m−1 =
[
nβmA∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ cAβ
m
A
] (
(m−1)βm−1A∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ 2
)
−
[
nβm−1A∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ cAβ
m−1
A
] (
mβmA∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ 2
)
(
mβmA∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ 2
)(
(m−1)βm−1A∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ 2
)
=
n(m−1)βmA βm−1A −nmβmA βm−1A∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ 2
[
nβmA∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
− nβ
m−1
A∑n
k=m β
k
A
]
+
(
(m−1)βm−1A∑n
k=m β
k
A
− mβmA∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
)
· cAβ1A(
mβmA∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ 2
)(
(m−1)βm−1A∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ 2
)
=
−nβmA βm−1A + (2n−m) (βmA )2 +
∑n
k=m+1
[(
(m− 1)βm−1A −mβmA
) · cAβ1A − 2n (βm−1A − βmA )]βkA(
mβ1A∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ 2
)(
(m−1)β1A∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ 2
) (∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A ·
∑n
k=m β
k
A
)
>
−nβmA βm−1A + (2n−m) (βmA )2 +
∑n
k=m+1
[
(2n−m) (βmA − βm−1A )+ βm−1A ]βkA(
mβ1A∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ 2
)(
(m−1)β1A∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ 2
) (∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A ·
∑n
k=m β
k
A
) (since cAβkA<1)
>
2βmA
[
(2n−m)βmA − nβm−1A
](
mβ1A∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ 2
)(
(m−1)β1A∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ 2
) (∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A ·
∑n
k=m β
k
A
)
> 0
where the last inequality follows that (2n−m)βmA − nβm−1A > n
(
βmA − βm−1A
)
> 0. This implies that α¯m
increases in m. Also,
αm − α¯m =
n∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ cA
m−1∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ 2βmA
−
n∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ cA
m∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ 2βmA
=
n∑n
k=m β
k
A
∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ 2βmA
(
n∑n
k=m β
k
A
− n∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
)
+
(
m∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
− m−1∑n
k=m β
k
A
)
cA(
m−1∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ 2βmA
)(
m∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ 2βmA
)
<
n− 2n+ (mβmA +∑nk=m+1 βkA) · 1βnA(
m−1∑n
k=m β
k
A
+ 2βmA
)(
m∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
+ 2βmA
) (∑n
k=m β
k
A ·
∑n
k=m+1 β
k
A
) (since cAβnA < 1)
< 0
which implies that αm < α¯m,∀1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1.
Combining the results from above, keeping the product line length n constant, the optimal pricing
function is a monotonically decreasing function in α∗, speciﬁcally:
25Since 1/βm+1A < 1/β
m
A , we know that α¯
m < αm+1.
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p∗A =

1
2
(
n∑n
k=1 β
k
A
+ cA
)
α∗ ∈ (0, α1]
α∗
βmA
α∗ ∈ (αm, α¯m]
α∗
βm+1A
α∗ ∈ (α¯m, αm+1]
,∀1≤m≤n-1
Note that α¯0 = α1 and thus the last two intervals in the price function can be merged into one (α¯m−1, α¯m].
If the luxury brand is not making negative proﬁts with the nth product, it has to charge a higher price than
its cost, which implies that cAβ
i
A < 1 holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. However, depending on the value of α∗ ∈ (0, 1),
the derivative of the proﬁt function Π∗(n,A) with respect to n at n = 1 takes on diﬀerent expressions due to
the piecewise structure of optimal pricing. Therefore we study the optimal product line length decision when
the share of low-end segment α∗ belongs to diﬀerent intervals : (0, α¯0(n)]∪ (α¯0(n), α¯1(n)]∪ ...∪ (α¯n−1(n), 1].
Let β(n) ≡∑ni=1 βiA and β′(n) ≡ β(n)− β(n− 1) with slight abuse of notation.
(a) Interval 1: α∗ ∈ (0,minn≤n∗
{
α¯0(n)
}
]
Π(p∗A, n) =
1
β(n)
(
n
2
− cAβ(n)
2
)2
Note that 1β(n)/n > cA always holds as long as cAβ
i
A < 1 holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
∂Π(p∗A, n)
∂n
=
β(n) (n− cAβ(n))
(
1
2 − cA2 β′(n)
)− β′(n) (n2 − cA2 β(n)) 2
β2(n)
=
=
(
n
β(n)
− cA
)(
1
2
− cA
2
β′(n)
)
− β′(n)
(
n
2β(n)
− cA
2
)
2
=
(
n
2β(n)
− cA
2
)(
1− cA
2
β′(n)− nβ
′(n)
2β(n)
)
1
2
(
n
β(n)
− cA
)(
1 +
βnA
2
[
n
β(n)
− cA
])
Hence the optimal n∗ should satisfy ∂Π
∗(n∗,A)
∂n ≥ 0 and ∂Π
∗(n∗+1,A)
∂n ≤ 0 which suggest the following two
inequalities should hold:
n∗
β(n∗)
− cA ≥ 0
and
n∗ + 1
β(n∗ + 1)
− cA < 0.
(b) Interval 2: α∗ ∈ (α¯m−1(n), α¯m(n)], ∀1 ≤ m ≤ n. In this case, the proﬁt function is:
Π(p∗A, n) =
(
α∗
βmA
− cA
)[
n− α∗
(
m+
β(n)− β(m)
βmA
)]
51
Given m, we take the derivative of Π with respect to n:
∂Π(p∗A, n)
∂n
=
(
α∗
βmA
− cA
)(
1− α∗ β
′(n)
βmA
)
= α∗
(
α∗
βmA
− cA
)(
1
α∗
− β
n
A
βmA
)
This shows that sign
(
∂Π∗(s,n)
∂n
)
= sign
(
1
α∗ − β
n
A
βmA
)
holds. When α∗ is constant, since m is a function of n,
the optimal n∗ should satisfy
1
α∗
− β
n∗
A
β
m(n∗)
A
≥ 0
and
1
α∗
− β
n∗
A
β
m(n∗)
A
< 0.
It is easy to see that when α∗ → 1, 1α∗ − β
n
A
β
m(n)
A
< 0 always holds for any n−m(n) > 1 because βnA > βm(n)A .
This implies that as the market share of counterfeiter approaches 1, it is never optimal to oﬀer multiple
products.
Derivation of the Results in Section 4.2:
When segmentation is endogenous, for all the peripheral products k ≥ 2, the greater the quality premium
∆µ, the more valuable their signalling value becomes (due to the lower prior on the quality of products).
The luxury brand can charge higher prices and since their demand function is Dk(p
k
A) = 1 − pkAβkA, it can
obtain higher proﬁts. This is consistent with the results from our benchmark model.
But the demand for the core product, diﬀerently from the demand of the peripheral products, depends on
the status signalling sensitivity of the consumer who is indiﬀerent between purchasing from the counterfeit
and the luxury brand, since
D1(p
1
A) = 1− α∗,
which is tied to ρ∗.
We can prove that there is a unique equilibrium solution for ρ∗ for any given set of parameter values
under endogenous segmentation, but the change in price of the core product may be positively or negatively
correlated with the overall proﬁt.
First note that, individual rationality (IR) constraint requires the marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent
between buying from the counterfeit and the luxury brand has a higher sensitivity compared to the consumer
who is indiﬀerent between buying a counterfeit and nothing:
α∗ ≥ α
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which implies
p1A − pC
µA − µC ·
σ20 + (σ
1)2
σ20
≥ pC [σ
2
0 + (σ
1)2]
(σ1)2µ0 + σ20µC
⇒ p
1
A − pC
µA − µC ≥
σ20pC
(σ1)2µ0 + σ20µC
⇒ p
1
A − pC
pC
≥ σ
2
0∆µ
(σ1)2ρ∆µ+ [σ20 + (σ
1)2]µC
. (14)
Second notice that the marginal consumer has a sensitivity that is weakly lower than the sensitivity of the
most sensitive consumer, α∗ ≤ 1, implying
p1A − pC
µA − µC ·
σ20 + (σ
1)2
σ20
≤ 1
⇒ p1A − pC ≤
σ20∆µ
σ20 + (σ
1)2
(15)
where (14),(15) deﬁne the lower and upper bound of p1A respectively. Equations (6), (7), (14), and (15)
ensure that the segment intervals ([α, α∗] ∪ [α∗, 1]) are well deﬁned.
Using the endogenous expression (6) in the deﬁnition of market share ρ, we obtain:
ρ = 1− α∗ = 1− p
1
A − pC
µA − µC ·
σ20 + (σ
1)2
σ20
(16)
The proﬁt function of the counterfeiter is given by
Π(1, C) = (pC − cC) · (α∗ − α)
= (pC − cC) · [ p
1
A − pC
µA − µC ·
σ20 + (σ
1)2
σ20
− pC
(σ1)2µ0 + σ20µC
· (σ20 + (σ1)2)]
F.O.C. with respect to price yields
p∗C =
1
2
[cC + p
1
A ·
(σ1)2µ0 + σ
2
0µC
(σ1)2µ0 + σ20µA
] (17)
s.t. µ0 = ρµA + (1− ρ)µC
Substituting for pC in Equation (16), we obtain a direct relationship between ρ and p
1
A:
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ρ = 1−
p1A[1− 12 (σ
1)2µ0+σ
2
0µC
(σ1)2µ0+σ20µA
]− 12cC
µA − µC
(1− ρ)∆µ = p1A[1−
1
2
ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
]
µC
ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
· µAµC
]
µC
]− 1
2
cC
2(1− ρ)∆µ+ cC = p1A
ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
·
(
2µA
µC
− 1
)]
µC
ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
· µAµC
]
µC

which gives the price as a function of ρ:
p1A =
ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
· µAµC
]
µC
ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
·
(
2µA
µC
− 1
)]
µC
· (2(1− ρ)∆µ+ cC) .
Let's investigate how the market share ρ responds to a change in the price of the core product p1A. To
this end, we apply the implicit function theorem by diﬀerentiating both sides of the above equation with
respect to p1A:
1 = ∂
 ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
· µAµC
]
µC
ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
·
(
2µA
µC
− 1
)]
µC
· (2(1− ρ)∆µ+ cC)
 /∂p1A
ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
·
(
2µA
µC
− 1
)]
µC = ∆µ
[
2 (1− 2ρ) ∆µ− 2
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
· µA
µC
]
µC + cC − p1A
]
∂ρ
∂pA
∂ρ
∂pA
=
ρ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
·
(
2µA
µC
− 1
)]
µC
∆µ[
2
(
−2ρ∆µ+
(
1− σ20
σ21
)
µA
)
+ cC − p1A
]
Note that the numerator of RHS is always positive and the denominator of RHS is negative on ρ ∈(0, 1) if
σ20
σ21
≥ 1, which leads to a negative relationship between ρ and pA, i.e. ∂ρ∂pA < 0. Hence if σ20 ≥ σ21 holds26,
then an increase in the price of the core product leads to a smaller high-end segment and in turn lowers
the prior mean, thereby building up more valuable signals for all the products oﬀered by the luxury brands.
Therefore the problem of the luxury brand to choose the optimal prices is equivalent to choosing an optimal
market share ρ.
Recall that the marginal consumer buys one and only one product (i.e. the core product) and the demand
of peripheral products is a strict subset of the demand of the core products. We can rewrite the proﬁt as a
function of ρ:
26This condition simply assumes that the signals carried by the core products should be weakly more precise than
the prior.
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Π(n,A) = max
{
ρ
(
p1A − c1A
)
, 0
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi1 :total proﬁt of the core product
+
n∑
i=2
1
βiA
(
1
2
− c
i
Aβ
i
A
2
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi2: total proﬁt of the remaining (n− 1) products
Substituting for p1A and
{
βiA
}
i=2,...,n
and diﬀerentiating each term w.r.t. ρ,
∂pi1
∂ρ |pi1>0
=

ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
· µA
µC
]
µC
ρ∆µ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
·
(
2µA
µC
− 1
)]
µC
· (2(1− ρ)∆µ+ cC)− cA
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ρ·
[
2
(
−2ρ∆µ+
(
1− σ20
σ21
)
µA
)
+ cC − p1A
]
ρ+
[
1 +
σ20
σ21
·
(
2µA
µC
− 1
)]
µC
∆µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∂pi2
∂ρ
= −
n∑
i=2
1
4
1−
 ciA
(1− ρ)∆µ
[
σ2(i−1)
σ20
· σ2(i−1)σ2(i−1)+(σi)2
]
2
 ·∆µ [σ2(i− 1)
σ20
· σ
2(i− 1)
σ2(i− 1) + (σi)2
] ≤ 0
we observe that sign
(
∂pi1
∂ρ
)
is ambiguous for ρ ∈ (0, 1). However, we know that:
∂Π(n,A)
∂ρ
(ρ = 0) =
∂pi1
∂ρ
(ρ = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
∂pi2
∂ρ
(ρ = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
< 0
∂Π(n,A)
∂ρ
(ρ = 1) =
∂pi1
∂ρ
(ρ = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
∂pi2
∂ρ
(ρ = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0
When ρ = 1, ρ
(
p1A − c1A
)
=
µA
(
1+
σ20
σ21
)
µA
(
1+
σ20
σ21
)
+∆µ
· cC − cA < 0 so there exists some ρ¯ > 0 such that pi1(ρ) ≡ 0, for
all ρ ∈ (ρ¯, 1]. Hence by intermediate value theorem, there exists a ρ∗ ∈ (0, ρ¯] such that ∂Π(n,A)∂ρ (ρ = ρ∗) = 0.
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